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This chapter critically assesses the regulation approach to the critique of political 
economy.1 It starts with the theoretical background to regulation theories; moves on to 
compare the main approaches and their various fields of application; and then offers 
some methodological and epistemological criticisms of the leading schools. Then come 
some more general methodological remarks on the object and subject of regulation and 
some specific comments on one of the weakest areas of regulation theory - its account 
of the state. Thus this chapter focuses on methodology and general theory rather than 
empirical analysis.  
Although somewhat abstract, these concerns are still relevant. For, as the key concepts 
have become common academic currency and related terms such as Fordism and 
post-Fordism pervade the mass media, the original methodological concerns of the 
pioneer regulation theorists are often forgotten. Scientific progress in a particular school 
often depends on forgetting its pioneers but this is no imperative: classic texts may well 
have a continuing relevance. In the regulationist case, three serious effects stem from 
this ill-judged neglect of pioneer texts. First, the approach is often falsely equated with 
the analysis of Fordism, its crisis, and the transition to so-called post-Fordist regimes. 
But not every study of Fordism is regulationist nor is every regulationist study 
concerned with (post-)Fordism. Second, although early studies emphasised the primacy 
of the class struggle in the genesis, dynamic, and crisis of different accumulation 
regimes and modes of regulation, more recent regulationist studies have often focused 
on questions of structural cohesion and neglected social agency. Sometimes this is 
coupled with an appeal to regulation theory to justify a 'new realism' and 
accommodation to the current capitalist offensive. These two problems give rise to a 
third: dismissing regulation theory as a whole because it is allegedly inconsistent with 
the first principles of Marxism (cf. Bonefeld 1987; Clarke 1988a; Foster 1988; Holloway 
1987a, 1988).  
 
I. The Regulationist Research Programme 
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In most commentaries regulation theory is identified with the work of French political 
economists since the l970s. The French regulationists themselves can be divided into 
three main groups: Grenoblois, Parisian, and PCF-CME. But other approaches to 
regulation theory must also be considered: the Amsterdam school, West German 
regulationists, the 'Nordic models' group, and the American radicals. In spreading my 
net so widely I have interpreted regulation theory as a continuing research programme 
rather than an already established and monolithic theoretical system. Even the 
dominant Parisian theorists hardly constitute a single school with a fixed, coherent, and 
complete set of concepts. But they are certainly contributing, along with others, to a 
broad, continuing, and hopefully progressive research programme. 
The latter is defined by four shared features. Although two of them are methodological 
and two substantive in character, all four can be traced back to the common Marxist 
heritage of the regulation approach. First this programme typically works with a 
scientific realist ontology and epistemology; second, in line with this basic scientific 
realism, it adopts what I have elsewhere called the method of 'articulation'2 in building 
theories of regulation. Neither of these methodological features is exclusively Marxist 
nor do all Marxist theories share them. But there is certainly a strong affinity between 
scientific realism and Marxism and, given their particular concern with political 
economy, almost all regulation theories have adopted this approach. Third, turning to 
the broad substantive theoretical concerns of the regulation research programme, they 
derive from the general Marxist tradition of historical materialism (at least in Europe)3 
with its interest in the political economy of capitalism and the anatomy of bourgeois 
society. And, fourth, within this general field of enquiry, it is particularly concerned with 
the changing forms and mechanisms (institutions, networks, procedures, modes of 
calculation, and norms) in and through which the expanded reproduction of capital as a 
social relation is secured. Moreover, given the inherent economic contradictions and 
emergent conflictual properties of the capitalist mode of production, this expanded 
social reproduction is always presented as partial, temporary, and unstable. I will return 
to these common principles after briefly presenting the main schools and approaches.  
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II. Approaches to Regulation 
 
Within this programme different schools and/or individual approaches can be defined 
in terms of their respective theoretical points of departure, their concern with different 
fields and/or levels of regulation. This section simply lists some of the main regulationist 
schools or tendencies. It ignores the various precursors of the regulation approach as 
well as individual scholars who may work with regulation concepts. How many scholars 
make a school is debateable - especially as the latter rarely embodies a unified and 
fully coherent theoretical system. For, as it expands, the thinking of its individual 
adherents changes, new adherents introduce further variety, and favoured definitions, 
conceptions, theories, and historical explanations begin to diverge (cf. Kotz 1988: 1;  
Hübner 1989: 12-14). This is especially clear with the Parisian school. Because there 
are significant differences within single schools as well as some overlap among them, I 
also provide an alternative classification based on approaches to the principal object or 
site of regulation.    
 
1. Seven Regulationist Schools 
With some hesitation one can usefully distinguish seven main schools within the 
regulationist approach. Sometimes the names are those adopted by the schools 
themselves but sometimes they are merely chosen to facilitate subsequent discussion. 
In no particular order, the seven schools are:  
1. Grenoblois: the Groupe de recherche sur la regulation d'economies capitalistes 
(GRREC) have been engaged in major collaborative research on regulation in capitalist 
societies since the mid-1970s. They adopt two main reference points: a critique of the 
theory of general economic equilibrium as an adequate basis for understanding 
capitalist dynamics (cf. de Bernis 1977; di Ruzza 1981) and a periodization of 
capitalism into three stages, each with its own mode of regulation. Against general 
economic equilibrium theory with its tendency to operate outside real time and space, 
the grenoblois stress the need for social procedures of regulation which secure the 
expanded reproduction of capital for limited time periods in a given economic space 
(with its productive system). These procedures must maintain an adequate rate of profit 
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for all sectors of capital in the face of capitalist competition and secure a tolerable 
balance between the structures of production and consumption in the face of the class 
struggle. In looking at economic processes in real time and space, the grenoblois also 
distinguish three main types of economic tendency: monotonic trends, conjunctural 
fluctuations, and institutional discontinuities. Thus a further function of social modes of 
regulation (which are themselves institutional) is to confine conjunctural fluctuations 
within broad limits compatible with continued accumulation. However, in dividing 
capitalism into three stages, the grenoblois stress that no mode of regulation can 
succeed forever. Crises in the various social procedures that comprise a mode of 
regulation will trigger struggles to find the next viable mode of regulation. The three 
stages which have occurred so far are: competitive or liberal capitalism, simple 
monopoly and state monopoly capitalism (a useful selection of grenoblois articles is 
reprinted in GRREC, 1983). 
2. Parisian: the Parisian regulationists have diverged from their common starting 
points in joint discussion of Aglietta's thesis at INSEE (1974-5) and/or in CEPREMAP's 
1976-7 research project on inflation.4 Indeed, despite their institutional links and several 
common theoretical reference points, it is now debateable whether they comprise a 
single school. A reading of the earliest Parisian texts reveals a clear commitment to the 
realist Marxist approach of the 1857 Introduction as well as an ambivalent legacy from 
the Althusserian school5. The initial studies were concerned with Fordism in the USA, 
the nature of monopoly capitalism, the causes of inflation (especially in France), and 
the development of public spending by the French state. In contrast to the grenoblois 
and orthodox state monopoly capitalism theories, the Parisians distinguish only two 
basic stages of capitalism: extensive and intensive. In an extensive accumulation 
regime capitalism expands mainly by spreading into new areas of activity (at the 
expense of non-capitalist producers at home or abroad); and, in an intensive regime, 
capital is accumulated mainly by the reorganisation of existing areas of capitalist activity 
in order to increase the rate of relative surplus-value.6 Parisian theorists also claim that 
an extensive regime is dominated by a competitive mode of regulation and an intensive 
one by monopolistic regulation. In both cases these modes of regulation are first 
defined in terms of the wage relation and only then in terms of the forms of competition: 
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thus competitive regulation involves flexi-wage formation and the monopolistic mode is 
based on collective bargaining and rising consumption norms.7 In addition, whereas the 
extensive regime is based on metallic money, the intensive regime is based on credit 
and state money. Parisian theorists generally work with three crucial concepts: regime 
of accumulation, mode of growth, and mode of regulation. These are located not only in 
a movement from abstract to concrete but also in an orthogonal movement from simple 
to complex: thus mode of regulation involves crucial non-economic moments as well as 
a more detailed specification of the economic aspects of a social formation. In later 
work Parisian theorists have distinguished more accumulation regimes and discussed 
transitional periods in greater detail. They have also looked mainly at the development 
and dynamics of Fordism, neo-Fordism, and post-Fordism considered as regimes of 
accumulation and/or modes of regulation in specific national economies and stress the 
heterogeneity of their national variants (useful reviews are found in Boyer 1986a;  
Hübner 1989; Noel 1987; and de Vroey 1984).  
 3. The PCF-CME account: inspired by Paul Boccara, the French Communist Party 
in the mid-60s developed a new view of state monopoly capitalism (capitalisme 
monopoliste d'etat or CME). This was based on a supposed law of 'overaccumulation-
devalorization' and its impact on the relations between private monopolies and the 
state. Overaccumulation is rooted in the tendency of the rate of profit to fall and occurs 
because further progress in the development of productive forces is blocked by the 
prevailing relations of production. Overaccumulation is relative when current investment 
opportunities would not yield the average rate of profit and absolute when no profit 
would be made. In the short-term these problems are eliminated as private capitals 
reorganize the labour process and/or modify the conditions in which surplus-value is 
realized; in the long run overaccumulation must be eliminated through the 
devalorization of a part of the total social capital so that it secures a lower, zero, or even 
negative share of the total surplus-value. Responsibility for such devalorization in the 
state monopoly capitalist stage devolves primarily to the state. It is secured through 
public finance or subsidies for private monopoly investment8, nationalization of key 
infrastructural sectors to provide inputs below costs of production at the expense of 
higher charges to non-monopoly and/or domestic consumers, nationalization of 
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declining sectors to socialize losses, and other measures of economic policy. Thus the 
CME approach did not regard direct state intervention in the sphere of production as 
important. It focused instead on how monopoly capital is advantaged by state measures 
which transfer the formal ownership of capitals and/or redistribute profits among private 
capitals. It qualifies as a regulation approach (despite its economism and mechanistic 
mode of analysis) because it stresses the changing economic and political procedures 
needed to regulate capital accumulation within successive stages of capitalism. 
Boccara has dissociated himself from the more simple-minded applications of his work 
by the PCF and has continued to develop his own approach to 'economic regulation' in 
various independent publications (cf. Boccara 1980, 1985, 1986, 1988; see also 
Drugman 1984: 37; di Ruzza 1988). 
 4. The Amsterdam school has developed a distinctive approach based on a Marxist 
critique of political economy and a Gramscian analysis of hegemonic strategies. Its key 
concepts comprise: fractions of capital (especially money vs productive capital) and 
'comprehensive concepts of control'. The latter comprise a sort of potentially hegemonic 
project intended to win both bourgeois and popular support and grounded in an 
accumulation strategy which advances the specific interests of the dominant fraction 
but also secures the needs of capital in general and provide a flow of material and/or 
symbolic rewards to a critical mass among the dominated classes. Fractions of capital 
can be analysed at different levels of abstraction: (a) the capital-labour relation - the 
primacy of absolute or relative surplus-value in the labour process; (b) the circulation of 
capital - bank, commercial, or industrial capital; and (c) the distribution of profit - 
capitals, fractions of capital, landed interests, and a segment of the working class (Van 
der Pijl, 1985: 2; cf. Bode 1979). Economic and political class strategies are then 
analysed on all three levels of abstraction: initially in terms of ideal types (or 'proto-
concepts of control') corresponding to the liberal concept of money capital and the 
productivist orientation of productive capital and then in terms of the more concrete 
'comprehensive concepts of control' which characterize specific historical regimes. 
These serve to unify the ruling class and attract mass support and they can become 
hegemonic to the extent that they combine mutually compatible blueprints for 
conducting labour relations as well as for handling relations among various fractions of 
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capital (van der Pijl, 1984, 31). The corporate liberal concept, which served to organize 
Atlantic Fordism after the New Deal, synthesized the liberal and state monopoly 
productivist concepts. In general such overall concepts of control seek to unify the 
strategies adopted in labour relations, competition, socio-economic policies, ideological 
matters, and international politics and they remain valid for at least a specific period. 
They must be secured through hegemonic projects, material compensation, and 
symbolic rewards and take account of the constellation of (national and international) 
economic and class forces providing the structural context in which interests are 
politically articulated (ibid 7-8; cf Overbeek 1988: 21-26). This approach qualifies as 
regulationist both on methodological grounds and because it argues that 
comprehensive concepts of control are needed to secure the conditions for capital 
accumulation and political class domination. But it has a distinctive political and 
strategic in orientation and is also more oriented to international aspects (representative 
work includes: Bode 1979; Holman 1987-8, 1989; Overbeek 1989; van der Pijl 1984, 
1988, 1989).  
5. The West German school: the best known contributors here are Joachim Hirsch 
and his fellow researchers in Frankfurt and Berlin; but we could also mention a 
Konstanz school concerned with Fordism as well as Lutz's account of the reasons for 
prosperity in West Germany (1984). The most distinctive feature of the work undertaken 
by Hirsch and his associates is its focus on Vergesellschaftung (societalization or 
'society effect'): in this sense they explore not only the regulation of the accumulation 
process in narrow economic terms but also that of capitalist societies as a whole 
through specific modes of mass integration and the formation of an 'historic bloc' which 
unifies the economic 'base' and its political and ideological superstructures. They 
combine a regulation approach to the political economy with their own account of the 
capitalist state; and they analyse many phenomena - from the nuclear family and the 
city through party systems and corporatist arrangements to social movements and new 
forms of subjectivity. The most distinctive features of their work are its re-interpretation 
of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall in regulationist terms and their concern with 
the role of the state and political parties in securing the conditions for effective societal 
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regulation (for reviews of the West German approach, see Jessop 1988;  Hübner and 
Mahnkopf 1988). 
6. The Nordic approach is mainly associated with social scientists who have 
participated in the Nordic summer school and have cooperated on the Nordic Economic 
Policy Project concerned with the contrasting 'economic policy models' in nordic 
countries (for an introduction, see Mjøset 1987). Although explicitly influenced by 
Parisian regulation theory, this approach is distinguished by its concerns with national 
modes of growth (defined through the impact of the dominant export sector in different 
nordic economies) and national modes of economic policy making (reflecting the mode 
of growth, the political traditions, and the changing balance of economic and political 
forces in each country). The initial project focused on different responses to the 
economic crisis of the 1970s and had less to say about the transition to new regimes of 
accumulation and modes of regulation. But the latter aspects have since been 
examined by some 'Nordic' scholars (representative works are: Andersson 1986; Mjøset 
1986, 1987, and 1988). 
 7. Regulationist currents can be discerned in North America. The most distinctive is 
the so-called 'social structure of accumulation' (or SSA) approach: this argues that 
sustained periods of accumulation require specific social and political conditions to 
support and reinforce the economic factors making for growth. The 'SSA' is reproduced 
in and through a specific balance of forces and changes in this balance can cause a 
major economic crisis. Thus this approach explores the correspondence between such 
structures and long waves of capital accumulation and/or different locations in the world 
system. This concept serves similar theoretical purposes to concepts such as historic 
bloc, mode of societalization, and mode of social regulation but is often presented in a 
more speculative (e.g., Gordon 1980) and/or empiricist manner (e.g., Bowles et al. 
1984) than would be needed to satisfy the scientific realist canons of Marxist theorizing 
(see below). It also puts more weight on shifts in the balance of power than do the 
European regulationist schools (for an overview see Mehrwert, 28 1986). 
Two further currents exist in North America but, as they are mainly concerned to 
develop and apply concepts and arguments common to much regulation theory, they 
are less distinctive. They comprise: (a) analyses of Fordism, neo-Fordism, and post-
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Fordism by political economists, urban sociologists, radical geographers, and others 
(e.g., Florida and Feldman 1988; Harvey 1988; Harvey and Scott 1988; Kenney and 
Florida 1988, 1989; Scott 1988); and (b) the work of other radical political economists 
interested in the conditions of postwar American growth (e.g. Bernstein 1988; Davis 
1986). A parallel current can be found in Piore and Sabel's work on Fordism and 
flexible specialisation and its resulting, ongoing cross-national research programme 
(Piore and Sabel 1984; Sabel 1982).  
There is no distinctive British regulation school but several theorists have been 
working with regulation theory and/or with related concepts such as Fordism. A typical 
example is Dunford (1988): he draws heavily on Parisian, Amsterdam, and West 
German perspectives in developing an account of Fordism and its crisis in Britain, 
France, and Italy (cf. Dunford and Perrons 1983 on Britain). Other British work along 
these lines is reviewed in Allen and Massey (1989) and one could also consult Hirst and 
Zeitlin (1988) and Blackburn et al. (1985). 
 
2. Four Types of Regulation Approach) 
There is clearly some divergence within individual schools (notably the Parisian) and 
some overlap among them. There are also individual scholars whose work is not easily 
subsumed in any one school. Accordingly it is worth classifying approaches to 
regulation in another way: in terms of their substantive focus (national or international) 
and relative theoretical complexity (concern with economic mechanisms alone or with 
societalization as well as economic mechanisms). Cross-classifying, we can distinguish 
four general sets of approaches. Together with some examples these are portrayed in 
Diagram 1; and they can be briefly described as follows:   
 
1. One set of approaches focuses on national accumulation regimes and modes of 
growth understood mainly in terms of their economic determinations. This was the 
approach adopted by Aglietta in the first regulationist analysis: a study of Fordism in 
the United States from a value-theoretical viewpoint (1974/1979). Subsequent 
studies have extended this approach to other national economic formations in one of 
two (largely successive) ways. Initially there was much interest in how the American 
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model of Fordism was diffused to other countries (for a critique of simple diffusion 
accounts, see Holman 1987-8). Later came concern for the dynamic of sui generis 
national modes of growth. Studies of the latter belong here to the extent that such 
modes are analyzed without regard to their insertion into the international economic 
order. The Nordic economic policy model studies, focusing on small, open 
economies, emphasise how economic policy models are shaped by specific forms of 
adhesion to the global Fordist system; but they take this as a constraint and focus on 
the internal dynamic of crisis response. Accordingly they are also best included in 
this first set. In his forthcoming study of modern hegemonies, however, Mjøset 
analyses the dynamic of national regimes as they are embedded in a changing world 
economic configuration with its own international modes of regulation. This study is 
more appropriately classified in our fourth category. 
2. A second set focuses on the international economic dimensions of regulation. 
Some studies along these lines examine the distinctive modes of international 
regulation and/or the form and extent of complementarities among different national 
modes of growth. Rather than treating the global economy as the mechanical sum of 
different national modes of growth and regulation, they argue that the international 
economy has its own sui generis properties, modes of regulation, and problems. 
These derive not only from the dynamic proportionality or changing 
complementarities among different economies within the overall international order 









approach for the USA, has also presented an important account of the 
complementarities among national modes of growth in his analysis of France and 
Page 11 
West Germany (1982) and studied different international monetary regimes as forms 
of regulation (1986; 1988). Turning from metropolitan capitals to (semi-)peripheral 
economies, we find studies of capitalist development in Southern Europe and the 
Third World. These examine how the nature of capital accumulation there has been 
influenced not only by internal economic, political, and social factors but also by the 
changing modalities of their insertion into the international division of labour and/or in 
the hierarchy of national economic spaces. Such studies include analyses of the 
genesis of peripheral Fordism and bloody Taylorization and how they fit into the 
global crisis of Fordism (e.g., Lipietz 1986b; Ominami 1986). Taking metropolitan 
and peripheral case studies together, then, these approaches either examine the 
international accumulation regime as a hierarchy of national modes of growth, with 
its own specific modes of regulation, its own crisis forms, etc.; and/or examine 
national modes of growth in terms of their possibilities of adhesion or exclusion from 
the international order and the interaction between nationalization, 
transnationalization, and internationalization tendencies (e.g., Mistral 1986).   
3. A third set examines the complex patterns of societalization (Vergesellschaftung) 
or 'social structures of accumulation' on the national level. Such studies are 
concerned with: a) the development and dynamic of modes of regulation extending 
beyond the economic sphere; and/or b) the 'historic blocs' which encadre relatively 
stable modes of growth and regulation and help to consolidate them. This approach 
gives particular attention to the state and hegemony as central elements in societal 
regulation but also examines other social forms and institutions. The West German 
and American radical approaches are the most obvious cases here but we should 
also mention the growing body of work concerned with the political geography of 
accumulation, urban and rural restructuring, and the state's role in regulation.  
4. A fourth set of approaches studies international 'societalization'. They examine the 
complementarities among emergent international structures and strategies and/or 
attempts to establish a global order through international regimes of one kind or 
another. As yet this approach is relatively unexplored in regulationist terms and 
should therefore figure centrally in any future research agenda. The clearest 
exemplar among existing currents is the Amsterdam school (e.g. Holman 1987-8; 
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van der Pijl 1984, 1988, 1989). An interesting approach close to regulation theory 
can be found in Michel Beaud's recent work on interrelations among national 
societies within the framework of evolving global hierarchies (Beaud 1987). More 
distant from the regulationist approach is the so-called 'international regimes' 
approach with its mixture of idealist and realist arguments (for good recent example, 
see: Cox 1987; Gill and Law 1988; critical surveys of international regimes studies, 
see: Krasner, 1983; Haggard and Simmons, 1987; Wolf and Zuern, 1986). 
 
III. Realist Methodology and Regulation Theory 
This section deals with three methodological issues: a) the ontological assumptions 
which typically underpin regulation theory; b) the complex movement involved in theory 
construction and explanation; and c) the order of presentation appropriate to studies of 
regulation. In each case the main ideas already occurred in the classic Marxian texts on 
political economy and were outlined more systematically in the early regulationist texts. 
As subsequent work has turned to more middle range issues, however, these distinctive 
methodological foundations have been neglected, weakened, and even abandoned. 
Hopefully the ensuing analysis will help to restore the critical thrust of the earlier 
studies.   
 
1. The Marxian Foundations 
Both the realist ontology implicit in Das Kapital and its associated epistemology, 
presented in the 1857 Introduction and elsewhere, were adopted by the early Parisian 
regulationists. Those West German state theorists interested in regulation adopt similar 
principles. What are these principles?  
The Marxian ontology implies that the real world is a world of contingently realized 
natural necessities. This world is triply complex: it is divided into different domains, each 
having its own causal powers and liabilities; these domains are involved in tangled 
hierarchies, with some domains emergent from others but reacting back on them;9 and 
each domain is itself stratified, comprising not only a level of real causal mechanisms 
and liabilities but also the levels on which such powers are actualised and/or can be 
empirically examined.10 For Marx the causal powers and liabilities in the domain of 
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social relations were typically analyzed in terms of tendencies and counter-tendencies11 
which together constitute its 'laws of motion'. These 'laws' operate as tendential causal 
mechanisms whose outcome depends on specific initial conditions as well as on the 
contingent interaction among tendencies and counter-tendencies; thus, in addition to 
real mechanisms, Marx also described their actual results in specific conjunctures and 
sometimes gave empirical indicators for these results. Labour-power is the most 
obvious example of a real power; but, as Marx emphasized, its actualization depends 
on the outcome of the struggle between capital and labour in specific conjunctures. The 
tendency of the rate of profit to fall and the mobilisation of counter-tendencies is one of 
the best known (and is certainly the most contentious) of these real mechanisms: 
whether or not the profit rate actually falls or not (and by how much) depends on the 
conditions in which the tendency and counter-tendencies operate. In turn this realist 
ontology implies that the social world comprises a complex synthesis of multiple 
determinations.12  
Given these general ontological assumptions, Marx concluded that the ultimate task 
of theory is to appropriate the 'real concrete' as a 'concrete in thought'. Modern 
epistemologists would argue, however, that, as it really exists beyond thought, the 'real 
concrete' can never be fully apprehended. For, although realists assume the existence 
of the real world and turn this assumption into a crucial 'regulative idea' in opposing 
rationalist and pragmatist accounts of science, they make no strong epistemological 
claims about having direct access to reality. Indeed, as Aglietta notes, the empirical is 
not external to theoretical construction itself:  
 
'facts are not atoms of reality to be classified, linked and assembled. Facts must 
rather be treated as units in a process, or articulations between relations in 
motion, which interfere and fuse with one another. They can only be grasped by 
the collaboration of different modes of investigation, and this is why the concrete 
can be reached in thought only at the end of a globalizing procedure in which 
deductive and critical moments interact' (Aglietta 1979: 66).  
Our knowledge of the real world is never theoretically innocent. This implies that the 
starting point for any enquiry is discursively constituted 13: one cannot move from a 
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theory-free 'real-concrete' to a theory-laden 'concrete in thought' (cf. Althusser 1975; 
Aglietta 1976: 15). In this sense the movement from 'real-concrete' to 'concrete in 
thought' is a movement from a simple and superficial category to an account which is 
complex (synthesizing multiple determinations) and also has ontological depth 
(identifying the underlying real mechanisms and connecting them to the actual and 
empirical aspects of the real-concrete). Thus, as Marx argued in the Grundrisse, if we 
speak of capital, at first it is only a name: its determinations must be developed step-by-
step (cited Backhaus 1975: 130). Likewise, in the 1857 Introduction, he suggests that 
scientific inquiry would begin with simple categories, 'chaotic conceptions', such as 
population, but would then decompose them into their elements and reconstruct them 
again as a complex of diverse determinations (1857: 100-1).  
As the spiral of scientific enquiry continues, the elements of the 'real concrete' are 
defined with increasing complexity and concreteness. This means that 'concepts are 
never introduced once and for all at a single level of abstraction' but are continually 
redefined in the movement from abstract to concrete - acquiring new forms and 
transcending the limits of their previous formulations (Aglietta 1979: 15-16). There is 
always a dialectical interplay of abstract and concrete which moves in spiral fashion as 
the introduction of lower order concepts entails modifications in higher order concepts 
(cf. Benassy et al. 1977; Gerstein 1987). In this sense 'the objective is the development 
of concepts and not the 'verification' of a finished theory' (Aglietta 1979: 66, cf. 15). 
Lipietz likewise argues that realist theorists have 'always to strive for greater precision in 
the concepts and thus always to be producing more concepts which must then be 
articulated (Lipietz 1987a: 5-6). And Norton criticises the American radicals for failing to 
rethink and transform their initially-posited causal mechanisms as their argument is 
developed more concretely and additional processes and relationships are considered. 
Instead, in contrast, he argues, to Aglietta's approach, they treat these mechanisms as 
fixed, once established at an abstract level (Norton 1988a: 203, 220-2; cf. specifically 
criticising the SSA approach in this respect, Nolan and Edwards 1984: 199). 
Empirical evidence still has a key role to play in building and evaluating theory but it 
must be understood as a mediated result of intervention in the real world. Evidence 
comprises statements which are produced by intervening in the real world and thereby 
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somehow reflect the nature of that world. But, in addition to this mediated 
presence/absence of the real, the form and content of these evidential statements will 
also depend on specific theoretical, technical, and experimental conditions affecting the 
nature of the measurements or observations concerned as well as on the theories 
under examination. Thus, if Marxist epistemology does involve appropriating the 'real-
concrete' as a 'concrete in thought', appropriation must refer to a qualitative change in 
our understanding of the 'real world'. It involves a complex and spiral process in which 
theoretical statements and evidential statements are confronted and modify each other. 
Thus theoretical argument moves between hypothetic-deductive and experimental 
phases so that there is a continual, dialectical transformation of concepts. It is these 
dialectical phases which are crucial for scientific development and 'make theory 
something other than the exposition of conclusions already implicitly contained in an 
axiomatic system' (Aglietta 1976: 15-16; cf. Marx on 'the working up of observation and 
conception into concepts', 1857: 101). In this sense theory can be seen as an open 
process and not a final product. 
This also implies that a given scientific enquiry need not start afresh from the real 
world in all its complexity. Indeed science cannot start with the real world: to suggest 
otherwise would entail an empiricist understanding of the 'real-concrete' rather than a 
stress on its theoretical status. Thus a given enquiry can establish its explanendum at 
various levels of abstraction and different degrees of complexity14 and the adequacy of 
any explanation would then be assessed relative to that explanendum. It would be 
adequate if, at the level of abstraction and the degree of complexity in terms of which a 
problem is defined, it establishes a set of conditions which are together necessary 
and/or sufficient to produce the effects given in the explanendum. Thus one cannot 
criticize a given explanation for failing to explain phenomena that are beyond its own 
explanendum, i.e., phenomena which are defined as more concrete and/or more 
complex. Indeed, the principle of the overdetermination of the 'real-concrete' (i.e., its 
'contingent necessity') implies its underdetermination at more abstract and simple levels 
of analysis. But this does not mean that any adequate explanation is as good as any 
other at a given level of abstraction or complexity. For, if the explanendum in question is 
redefined or elaborated through concretization (lowering the level of abstraction) and/or 
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through what might be called 'complexification' (adding determinations from other 
planes of analysis), it should be possible to extend or expand the corresponding 
explanation without making the overall argument inconsistent. An explanation will be 
considered inadequate, then, if extending it to a lower level of abstraction produces a 
contradiction.  
This suggests two strategies for explanation. Either an explanation must recognise 
its indeterminacy vis-a-vis lower levels of abstraction and leave certain issues 
unresolved at its chosen level of operation; or it must make certain assumptions which 
permit a determinate explanation without pre-empting subsequent concretization. The 
former strategy is found in the argument that the formal possibilities of capitalist crisis 
do not mean that a crisis will actually occur and/or must take a given form; the latter in 
such postulates as an average rate of profit or the assumption that individual capitals 
act simply as Träger of the capital relation. This criterion also implies that explanations 
adequate to one plane of analysis should be commensurable with those adequate to 
the explanation of other planes. But there are no formal rules which could guarantee a 
correct choice in cases of incommensurability and any substantive conventions will 
depend on one's chosen theoretical framework. 
Next, whatever the specific methods of discovery, Marx's methodology requires that 
the theory itself be presented as a movement from abstract to concrete. This holds both 
for a systematic presentation of the basic theoretical framework as well as for specific 
explanations of historical events and/or processes. However, in focusing mainly on the 
economic region in the capitalist mode of production (with its characteristic institutional 
separation and relative autonomy of different societal spheres), Marx tended to 
overlook the fact that there are actually two types of movement in any realist analysis: 
abstract-concrete and simple-complex. The first involves the position a given concept 
should occupy in the spiral movement from abstract to concrete along one plane of 
analysis. The second type of movement concerns the combination of different planes of 
analysis. The greater the number of planes of analysis which are articulated, the more 
complex is the analysis. This second movement is particularly relevant for 
understanding the overdetermination of events, processes, and conjunctures through 
the interaction of several regions. Although Marx himself did not explicate this 
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distinction between types of theoretical movement, it is certainly implicit in his well-
known statement that one should aim to reproduce the 'real-concrete' as a 'concrete-in-
thought', i.e., as the concrete synthesis of multiple determinations and relations (Marx 
1857: 100). 
To these arguments Lipietz has added another. He suggests that the original 
Marxian method involved not only a movement from abstract to concrete to analyze the 
natural necessities (laws, tendencies) entailed in the internal articulation of objective 
social relations but also a movement from the 'esoteric' to the 'exoteric' to analyze the 
connections between these objective relations and the fetishized world of lived 
experience and the impact that this enchanted world has on the overall movement of 
capital (1983: 11-12). According to Lipietz, this exoteric, enchanted world comprises all 
those representations created by economic agents in connection with their own 
behaviour and the circumstances they face. Even though their conduct and 
circumstances are rooted in the esoteric world, men live their lives through these 
representations. Ignoring these external forms would therefore prevent any significant 
understanding of a large part of reality (12-13). For Lipietz the key category for 
deciphering the enchanted world of lived experience is 'fetishism' and its various forms 
(1983: 18-31, 45-52). He also argues that crisis is rooted as much in the exoteric as the 
esoteric world. Thus different connections between the esoteric world of values and the 
exoteric world of prices obtain in the competitive and monopoly modes of regulation 
and this leads in turn to different forms of crisis (1983: 102-3). As far as I know Lipietz is 
alone in advocating this addition to the canons of regulation methodology - although 
elements of this approach can be found in the earlier work of CEPREMAP/CORDES, to 
which Lipietz also belonged (Benassy et al. 1977; see also Boyer 1986a: 44-5). 
One final point should be made about this methodology: its open character. As 
Aglietta stated in his thesis: 'regulation theory would not be a closed theory describing 
the functioning of an economic model; this is the theory of equilibrated growth in its 
many forms. It must be open, i.e., susceptible to continued elaboration; which means 
not only additions and refinements, but ruptures in the theory which must be made 
possible by the problematic adopted' (1974: VI). This is another sense in which we can 
describe regulation studies as moments in a continuing research programme.  
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IV. The French Connection 
This section deals with early French analyses to show how the regulationist research 
programme developed only gradually. It was Boccara who first introduced the word 
'regulation' but it did not really become a central concept in his work until the late 1970s, 
when he linked it the issues of an alternative, socialist form of economic and social 
management (gestion) in solving the structural crisis. In the Parisian school the idea of 
regulation was initially deployed in a loose, pre-theoretical manner to define the site of a 
problem; gradually it acquired a degree of conceptual solidity; but elements of ambiguity 
regarding both the object of regulation and the forms of regulation remain to this day. 
GRREC has always been less self-conscious methodologically than the early parisiens 
but has also had a more clearly defined theoretical paradigm. Thus the meaning of 
regulation has changed less. But, in focusing on how a productive system is regulated, 
other problems have arisen. These concern above all the relation between economic 
and social regulation.       
 
1. Boccara's Movement from Word to Concept 
Boccara has made three claims about his approach: that he was the first to use the 
concept of regulation, that his approach was vulgarised in collective PCF publications, 
and that it was later developed by Aglietta, who had belonged both to the PCF group of 
economists organised by Boccara and to the GRREC (Boccara 1988: 4-6, 11, 53). 
However, although he certainly used the word 'regulation' in his early studies (e.g. 
1961), it was only conceptualized adequately in his work from 1971 onwards (cf. 
Boccara 1988). We should really speak of a parallel evolution of the three French 
regulation schools - especially as many of Boccara's key ideas on regulation came 
much later. But, second, one should certainly not confuse his work with the cruder party 
treatises on state monopoly capitalism. Third, although Aglietta did develop some 
themes from Boccara's work (the need to study both accumulation and regulation, 
devalorisation, state monopoly capitalism), his work also differs in crucial respects. For 
Aglietta gave far more weight to the wage relation in its widest sense and the relations 
between departments I and II than did Boccara; analysed devalorisation differently; and 
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treated state monopoly capitalism only gesturally. Moreover, if one wants to trace the 
genesis of Aglietta's ideas, equal weight should be given to the work of Francois 
Perroux and Christian Palloix on dominant economies and the internationalisation of 
capital (cf.  Hübner 1989: 57-8).  
Even so Boccara can still claim paternity of a distinct type of French regulation theory, 
whose novelty consists in this:  
'it accounts for the structural changes occurring in structural crises of the 
capitalist system, relating them to its functioning (regulated en passant by prices 
of production) and to its long term fluctuations, linking them to the capitalist type 
of progression of the productivity of total labour (sc. dead and living labour). And 
it does so through an analysis of the role played by the overaccumulation-
devalorisation of capital in regulating the rate of profit' (1988: 24; cf. 33). 
At first Boccara treated overaccumulation and devalorisation as the central mechanism 
in the spontaneous, blind 'regulation' of the circuit of capital. He argued that 
accumulation typically occurred under the dominance of capital's search to reduce its 
need for living labour by installing dead labour (fixed capital) and that this process 
inevitably produced uneven, unstable growth, marked by constant disturbances and 
tensions. In the short run these could be overcome by deceleration in the increasing 
organic composition of capital and, above all, by recurrent increases in surplus-value; in 
the long run, however, they produced structural crises which brought long cycles of 
growth to an end. Only structural transformations could restore the cohesion of the 
circuit of capital and initiate a fresh long wave. This depended on the devalorisation of 
part of the total social capital combined with with modifications in the conditions of 
productivity and profitability (Boccara 1988: 42-7). 
More recently he argues that the succession of these long waves is not tied to 
technology and the labour process alone but also involves all human relations - socio-
economic, political, and cultural (1983: 40). This means that extra-economic factors 
must also be transformed. These 'anthroponomic' factors include family and 
generational patterns, training and education, labour and industrial relations, political 
institutions, and cultural norms and values (cf. Boccara 1980, 1988). In this sense he 
seems to have moved towards ideas akin to mode of regulation or societalisation. 
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In explaining postwar growth Boccara rejects the Fordist 'myths' of Parisian 
regulation theory with their emphasis on the balanced growth of mass production and 
mass consumption. He argues that it was due more to the general accumulation of 
dead labour (constant, especially fixed, capital) raising productivity, the growth of 
unproductive expenditures by the state (notably on education, health, and research), 
and the general expansion of services (1988: 53-63). The expansion of public and 
private services produced massive relative economies in the use of constant capital and 
so raised the productivity of total labour. But its unproductive elements eventually 
squeezed surplus value as the stock of dead labour gradually increased. Moreover the 
mixed economy, which had helped overcame the interwar crisis, has become a factor of 
crisis: mounting internal and external debt, counterproductive subventions, lower 
productivity, etc. (1983: 41). The way out is not to be found in flexible specialisation or 
automation (a capitalist solution) but in increased investment in human skills and the 
maximisation of disposible wealth and income (cf. Boccara 1985).  
 
2. The Parisian Regulation Approaches 
These developed in an intellectual climate much concerned with epistemological issues 
and early contributions show a methodological self-awareness that seems rather 
exaggerated today. Important reference points here were Marx's own studies and the 
structuralist reading of Capital offered by Althusser and his collaborators (Althusser 
1965; Althusser and Balibar 1968). But there is also a more general concern with 
regulation in cybernetics, thermodynamics, systems theory, autopoiesis, catastrophe 
theory, and so on (e.g., Brender 1977; Lichnerowicz 1977; Lipietz 1979; Aglietta 1982; 
Madeuf 1986). Even when considering more general issues of regulation, however, 
Parisian theorists related their concerns to substantive issues posed within a Marxist 
problematic. Thus their methodological interests were always overdetermined by the 
basic categories of Marx's critique of political economy. 
Their relation to Althusserian structuralism was ambivalent, to say the least, and their 
positions towards it changed over time. Properly to understand the regulationist 
position, therefore, we must make a detour through the Althusserian school. Althusser 
and his immediate circle were Marxist philosophers who tried to establish the specificity 
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of the Marxist dialectic (with a little help from Mao Zhe-Dong) and to clarify the core 
concepts needed for a historical materialist account of social formations. In addition to 
their criticisms of other currents within Western philosophy they also defined 
themselves in opposition to the twin deviations of economism and humanism within 
Marxism itself. Thus they opposed not only theoretical currents which saw the economy 
as an autonomous system which served as the dynamic basis of an epiphenomenal 
superstructure but also currents which explained the genesis and dynamic of social 
structures in terms of the actions of free-willed human subjects. 
The Althusserians themselves regarded a mode of production (and, by extension, a 
social formation) as a complex structured whole and viewed human agents as the mere 
Träger (or passive supports) of its self-reproduction. Thus a mode of production 
supposedly comprises several relatively autonomous regions which nonetheless 
condition each other: these regions are the economic, juridico-political, and ideological. 
At the same time they argued that the relations among these regions were subject to 
two kinds of determination: one of these regions would be dominant over the others in 
securing the overall social reproduction of the whole but which region would play this 
role was itself determined in the last instance by the specific form of the social relations 
of economic production. In the capitalist mode of production the economic region was 
not only determinant but also dominant since social reproduction (as well as production) 
was secured through the dominance of the value form. The Althusserian school itself 
neither developed an account of the value form (rejecting much of Capital itself as still 
flawed by theoretical impurities) nor elaborated the nature and limits of relative 
autonomy.15 Thus their contribution to a critique of political economy was limited. 
Moreover, shortly after condemning the humanist concern with social agency, Althusser 
and his fellow travellers stumbled, in May 1968, upon the class struggle (e.g., Althusser 
1976). Henceforth they turned from a one-sided emphasis on structures to a one-sided 
emphasis on class struggle. This further diverted them from serious concern with the 
dynamic of economic or social reproduction.  
As economists and/or engineers the early Parisian regulationists were by no means 
mere porteurs of Althusserian philosophy. Nonetheless they apparently adopted some 
of its general claims, such as the specificity of the Marxist dialectic (especially as a 
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guide to theory construction) or the need to analyse how modes of production were 
articulated. Likewise they employed some specific Althusserian concepts, such as 
'structure in dominance', social formation, overdetermination, interpellation, and 
apparatus. But they also firmly rejected Althusser's particular reading of the basic 
structure and concepts in Capital and, notably, his deliberate neglect of its very first 
chapter with its supposedly Hegelian foundations. Instead they insisted on the need to 
begin an analysis of capital as a social relation with the commodity, money, and value 
forms explored by Marx right at the outset of Capital. Thus, whereas Althusser and 
Balibar focused on those general concepts of historical materialism applicable to any 
and all modes of production, Parisian regulation theorists focused on the specific 
concepts needed to analyse the capitalist mode of production. Moreover, whereas 
Althusser and Balibar stressed how modes of production reproduced themselves, the 
parisiens knew more than enough about formal reproduction schemes to conclude that 
capital accumulation could not occur without disproportions and conflicts. Thus the key 
question became how such disproportions and conflicts are regulated within broad 
limits consistent with accumulation.   
In short the Parisians criticised the Althusserian assumption that structures somehow 
maintain themselves quasi-automatically, independently of effective social agency, and 
with no significant transformations. Rejecting the emphasis on unity characteristic of 
Althusser's concern with reproduction, regulation theorists stressed the 'unity of unity 
and struggle' in regulation (e.g., Benassy et al., 1977, vol 1: 5; Lipietz 1977, passim). 
They asked how capitalism could survive even though the capital relation itself 
inevitably produced antagonisms, contradictions, and crises - all of which made 
continuing accumulation improbable and generated major ruptures and structural shifts 
as capital develops (Aglietta 1974, 1976; Lipietz 1977, 1979). And, along with the later 
Althusser, who had been chastened by the May events, they emphasised the key role 
of class struggle in reproduction, regulation, and rupture alike.  
This analysis of reproduction as regulation was the starting point for much of Parisian 
regulation theory. It represented not only a reaction to the functionalism of the 
Althusserian account of social reproduction but also to the formalism of schemas of 
economic reproduction. The Parisians argued that Marx's use of such schemas to show 
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that reproduction was at least an abstract possibility remained formal; it could not really 
show how private economic agents might be brought to act in accordance with these 
reproduction requirements. This was the task of regulation theory (e.g., Benassy et al., 
1977, vol 1: 31-6). In explaining how both types of reproduction problem were solved, 
then, the parisiens looked to the specific institutional forms, societal norms, and 
patterns of strategic conduct. These expressed and regulated conflicts until the 
inevitable tensions and divergencies among these various regulatory forms reached 
crisis point (Aglietta 1982: vi; Lipietz 1979: 32-8; and 1987: 3-4). A period of struggle 
would then occur until new forms of regulation were stabilized.  
Thus regulation theory can be seen as a distinctive approach to problems of 
economic and social analysis. There is clearly scope for different interpretations of 
regulation and they can also be applied to different objects of regulation. Thus, although 
they agreed at first in adopting the value form as a starting point, the parisiens have 
since diverged on both the object and the mode of regulation. Before considering these 
differences, however, we should review Aglietta's pioneering research.  
Aglietta's thesis was entitled Accumulation et regulation du capitalisme en longue 
periode. However, although it clearly cannot be seen as regulationist avant la lettre, it 
was certainly penned avant le concept. For it developed neither a general theory of 
capitalist regulation nor a specific theory about its Fordist stage. Its guiding thread was 
the simple claim that accumulation and regulation were the twin faces of the capitalist 
system and that economic analysis had hitherto been too concerned with the former. In 
this context, however, the term 'regulation' had mainly diacritical and heuristic functions: 
it suggested that Aglietta would not provide a one-sided analysis of capital 
accumulation and its contradictions but would also look at social relations, their 
cohesion, and transformation (1974: viii; cf. 1979: 16). Thus, as well as examining the 
changing articulation between the twin laws of accumulation and competition attendant 
on the transition from extensive to intensive accumulation, his thesis explored how this 
transition was facilitated by changes in the structural forms which governed the wage-
relation at the heart of accumulation and/or the relations between capitals at the heart 
of competition. In this context his main concern was to construct the concept of 
monopoly capitalism and explore its laws of motion and structural forms in the 
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American case (1974, ix). Accordingly the main body of his thesis examined three key 
areas of modern American capitalism and the various structural forms involved in 
regulating them: the Fordist wage relation based on collective bargaining and the social 
wage, the large corporation with its role in coordinating valorisation in delimited areas, 
and financial capital's centralizing role as mediated through financial groups. However, 
although regulation as such did not figure prominently in the thesis, each of these forms 
could be interpreted as a primary element in a broader mode of regulation. 
Aglietta's well-known book was a fundamentally re-written version of his thesis. It 
was much more directly concerned to develop the regulationist approach but still 
presented the latter as a means of countering a one-sided concern with accumulation 
(1979: 15). Aglietta described regulation as an approach to capitalism which isolates 
the conditions and rhythms of its long-run cohesion and the forms of its crisis and social 
transformations under the disruptive and irreducible effect of class struggle (1979: 14-
17, 351-2, 384). Thus he was less concerned to theorise regulation as such and more 
interested in exploring the more or less coherent ensemble of mutually interdependent 
structural forms which might sustain a given accumulation regime. In line with his thesis 
Aglietta first examined the main structural forms that canalise and mediate the class 
antagonism inherent in the law of accumulation. Here he focused on the wage relation 
(rapport salarial) but defined it broadly to include the labour process as well as industrial 
relations and the social security system. The second part of his book examined the 
structural forms which governed the rivalry among capitals inherent in the law of 
competition. There he examined how norms of production and exchange were 
generalised within and across different branches of production and how the general 
rate of profit was established in and through competition.16 In both cases he presented 
the structural forms as institutions which emerged from the class struggle and acted as 
modes of cohesion of the basic social forms generated in the development of the core 
capital relation (1979: 19, 188). This analysis of structural forms was overshadowed, 
however, by a detailed examination of changes in the money and credit forms. For 
Aglietta's main argument was that the dynamic of overaccumulation and the mode of 
regulation in the intensive regime together entailed stagflationary tendencies which 
would culminate in a severe financial crisis. Hence the changing forms of money and 
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credit were emphasised in explaining the specificity of the crisis of Fordism even though 
the Fordist regime was first defined in terms of its distinctive wage relation (1979: 
passim). 
The theoretical assumptions and explanatory principles which underpin regulation 
theory were taken much further and also presented more clearly in the foreword to the 
second edition of Aglietta's book. By this time the école de la régulation had already 
emerged, so that this task was now much easier. At the same time, however, Aglietta 
had already moved some way from his original, value-theoretical approach - a trajectory 
which has continued so far that it has been rightly questioned whether Aglietta himself 
is still a regulationist ( Hübner 1989: 76-9; cf. Boyer 1986a: 33). This said, Aglietta 
argued that capitalist social relations (especially those expressed in commodities and 
the salariat) divide individuals and social groups and inevitably generate social rivalries 
and antagonisms; social institutions (or 'structural forms') give a contingent, material 
expression to the resulting conflicts by mediating and normalising them. This is 
accomplished by transforming antagonisms into simple differences. Yet this requires 
that such social institutions maintain contact with the sources of conflict and they must 
therefore continually reproduce rather than transcend the conflicts. It follows that crisis 
tendencies are always present in regulation: in stable regimes of growth, however, it is 
the normalising effects of institutions which predominate. These tendencies crystallize 
into a major crisis when emergent rigidities and new social conflicts escape 
normalisation and so create zones of instability (where new antagonisms can no longer 
be mediated by structural forms) and bases of rupture (where strains have become so 
intense that institutions function perversely, transmitting rather than absorbing 
tensions). Thus regulation always operates in an ambivalent manner. On the one hand, 
it offers a relatively stable framework within which different groups can develop macro-
strategies in the form of stylised models of macro-economic growth and corresponding 
forms of regulation. On the other hand, it also tends to block the fluidity or flexibility of 
market forces and thereby generates crisis tendencies (Aglietta 1982: v-vii). 
Building on Aglietta's work as well as Benassy's own distinction between the 
extensive and intensive forms of accumulation, the CEPREMAP inflation research 
group contrasted competitive and monopolist forms of regulation of the wage relation 
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and traced their implications for the conjunctural fluctuations and crisis tendencies of 
capitalism (Benassy et al. 1977). For them the object of regulation is an economic 
system and regulation itself comprises 'the ensemble of processes which govern the 
allocation of the factors of production, their utilisation, and their distribution in the 
context of this economic system... (and it creates) a minimum of coherence, or stability 
in the ensemble of these processes' (Benassy et al. 1977, vol II: 25). A parallel study at 
CEPREMAP looked more directly at regulation and the state through the evolution of 
public expenditures in France (cf. Delorme and Andre 1978, 1982). In a third major 
work in the regulationist tradition, Lipietz looked at the two main contradictions of 
capitalism (private ownership vs socialised production and bourgeoisie vs proletariat) 
and how they were regulated in terms of the variable articulation of markets, firms, and 
the state as regulating instances (1979: 54-5, 98 et seq.). And, also emerging from the 
CEPREMAP/CORDES research, there came a study by Boyer and Mistral of the close 
connections between accumulation and inflation in the French economy. Whereas 
Lipietz continued to work in the value-theoretical tradition, Boyer and Mistral adopted a 
price-theoretical approach and also incorporated elements from Kaldor, Keynes, and 
Kalecki (1978). 
This list could be continued but the point should already be clear that, despite similar 
methodological assumptions, early work in regulationist theory diverged on the 
structural forms, the sites, and the problems involved in regulation in significant 
respects. Indeed it has become so diffuse and ambiguous in the interim that Duharcourt 
can plausibly claim about Parisian regulation studies that: 'their relative homogeneity 
only stems from a certain constancy in vocabulary ("competitive regulation" vs 
"monopolistic regulation", "extensive accumulation" vs "intensive accumulation"...) and 
from similarities in the periodisation of capitalism' (1988: 136-7). Even Boyer, the 
current doyen of the Parisian approach, admits to difficulties in establishing the 
theoretical and political coherence of current work in this tradition (1986a: 33-4). The 
parisiens have extended the conceptual matrix in several directions, making it richer 
and more complex; but they also tend to stop at an enumeration of elements of a mode 
regulation and do not attempt to deepen the concept of regulation itself. At the same 
time they have divided into several currents. These differ not so much in terms of their 
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substantive focus (which still remains wide) as in the relative weight given to Marxian, 
Keynesian, Kaldorian, and Kaleckian concepts in the overall institutionalist perspective 
(cf. Duharcourt 1988;  Hübner 1989; de Vroey 1984; Mjøset 1985; Noel 1987).  
Nonetheless in a rough and ready synthetic fashion, the key Parisian concepts can 
be summarized as 'regime of accumulation', 'mode of growth', 'mode of regulation', and 
'model of development' (cf. Boyer 1986a). Accumulation regimes and modes of growth 
are concepts located at different levels of abstraction but their empirical referents are 
closely related. An accumulation regime comprises a particular pattern of production 
and consumption considered in abstraction from the existence of national economies 
which can be reproduced over time despite its conflictual tendencies. A national mode 
of growth comprises the pattern of production and consumption of a national economy 
considered in terms of its role in the international division of labour. Relatively stable 
accumulation regimes and national modes of growth involve a contingent, historically 
constituted, and societally reproduced correspondence between patterns of production 
and consumption. A mode of regulation refers to an institutional ensemble and complex 
of norms which can secure capitalist reproduction pro tempore despite the conflictual 
and antagonistic character of capitalist social relations. And, finally, a model of 
development (a term largely confined to Lipietz's work but nonetheless useful) refers to 
a pattern of development based on a) a dominant paradigm of industrialisation, b) an 
accumulation regime, and c) a mode of regulation (cf. Leborgne and Lipietz 1988: 77).  
 
3. The Grenoble School 
The grenoblois approach differs from both Boccarien and Parisian perspectives. The 
members of GRREC view the regulation approach as a coherent marxist theoretical 
alternative to general equilibrium theory. Accordingly they have defined both the nature 
and the object of regulation differently from the Parisians and have developed the 
approach in other directions. The object of regulation is defined as the articulation of 
the 'two laws of profit' (the TRPF and its counter-tendencies and the formation of a 
general rate of profit) within a given economic space with its own productive system. In 
turn the mode of regulation comprises the various forms of social adjustment 
(adequation) which secure the stable, coherent, and simultaneous realisation of these 
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two laws and which ensure their consistency with other economic variables (de Bernis 
1987: 4; di Ruzza 1987: 7). In developing this approach, GRREC argues that it adds 
something to Marx's analysis of Capital: for Marx failed to explain the long term 
structural transformation of capitalism in and through crises in the mode of regulation, 
offering only insights into the nature of the cyclical regulatory crises which occur within 
specific modes of regulation (de Bernis 1981: 171-3). These points will now be 
elaborated. 
GRREC operates on two main theoretical levels. First, it explores the most abstract 
laws of capitalism and the general conditions for their effective articulation so that 
accumulation can continue. There are two such laws. The first law comprises the 
tendency of the rate of profit to fall and the mobilisation of counter-tendencies to 
maximise this rate. The second is the tendential equalisation of the profit rate across 
branches. The realisation of these 'laws of profit' is not guaranteed through some 
automatic causal mechanism. Instead it occurs in and through class struggles and 
capitalist competition respectively. Thus the articulation among these laws (and hence, 
within this approach, continued accumulation) depends on specific social procedures. 
These must secure a contradictory unity among the forces and relations of production 
by adjusting the structure of production and social need so that they cohere.17 It is 
these procedures which comprise the mode of regulation. 
Second, in more concrete terms, GRREC examines the specific forms assumed by 
these laws and their articulation in particular productive systems. A productive system 
occupies a specific economic space (always pluri-national) with its own mode of 
regulation which secures a stable correspondence between the two laws. This implies 
that regulation does not operate at the level of the nation but the level of productive 
systems18 (de Bernis 1983: 254, 257). It is on the same level of analysis that they study 
international economic relations both within and among productive systems; internally 
these relations are integrated through a division of labour normed by the money of the 
central national economy, externally they are mediated through barter-like exchange 
relations normed by an international currency (di Ruzza 1982; de Bernis 1987). 
 According to GRREC crises are endogenous to productive systems and can take 
two different forms. First, there are regulatory crises. These are cyclical and occur 
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within a given mode of regulation, serving to restore its effective operation. Second, 
there are crises in the mode of regulation which stem from the emergent contradictions 
of the productive system. These are analysed in terms analogous to Marx's account of 
the emergent contradiction between the forces and relations of production. Thus 
GRREC argues that crises in the mode of regulation occur when the development of 
the productive forces (which are driven forward by the interplay of the two laws of profit) 
comes up against lags and rigidities rooted in the prevailing mode of regulation. 
GRREC also argue that, if capital accumulation is to expand once more, new regulatory 
procedures must be organised around a new type of productive system. In this context 
the current crisis can be explained through shifts in the international dimension of the 
productive system. For there has been a growing loss of sectoral coherence within 
productive systems owing to the transnationalisation of production, third world 
struggles, and so on (cf. Borelly 1988). 
 Despite these (and other) differences, there are also similarities between the 
grenoblois and Parisian regulation approaches. The typical conceptual triplet for the 
Parisians is regime of accumulation, mode of growth, and mode of regulation. GRREC 
operate with an analogous triplet which also moves from abstract to concrete. It 
comprises: the articulation of the two laws of profit within limits consistent with a 
balance between the productive structure and the satisfaction of social need; productive 
systems; and modes of regulation. Both groups employ the regulation approach to 
explore how economic and non-economic procedures can be articulated to produce a 
relatively stable, coherent, and dynamic structural framework which can in turn secure 
the expanded reproduction of capitalism. For, although Marx established the natural 
necessities entailed in the capitalist laws of motion, he did not fully explore the 
contingencies involved in their realisation. It is the task of regulation theories to extend 
Marx's analysis from the internal laws of the capitalist mode of production to the 
contingencies of capitalist accumulation. This task is conducted at different levels of 
abstraction and helps to realise Marx's own stated objective of analysing the real 
concrete as a concrete synthesis of multiple determinations.  
A further similarity concerns the tendency towards economism in both schools. This 
tendency was already evident in Aglietta's early work and is still present in more recent 
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Parisian work. It is even clearer in the grenoblois approach. Since GRREC argues that 
social regulation is mainly concerned with the economy and presents regulation theory 
as an alternative to general economic equilibrium theory, it is prone to economism in 
three main areas. First, it regards the state and civil society as largely external to the 
economy. Thus it overlooks how the latter is penetrated through and through by extra-
economic forces and relations. Second, although it puts the usual stress on the role of 
class struggle and competition as driving forces of accumulation, it nonetheless treats 
the dynamic of the productive system as endogenous. And, third, in so far as it takes 
account of non-economic phenomena, they are only presented in terms of their 
functions in the reproduction of the productive system. Together these problems 
suggest that the grenoblois run the risk of continually deepening their account of the 
internal mechanics of the economy and excluding other dimensions of social life 
(Drugman 1984: 50-1). We should also note here that Boccara's approach also 
displayed strong economistic tendencies: at first he confined the 'essential regulators' to 
the rate of profit and devalorisation and did not include the extra-economic issue of 
'anthroponomic' regulation until recently. Only when an equally rich and complex 
analysis of the form, modus operandi, and activities of the state (and other institutions 
or structural forms) is provided by these various French schools will they avoid this 
tendential economic reductionism or the less serious tendency towards a one-
dimensional view. 
 
4. Three Sources of Ambiguity in French Regulation Theory 
Although their overall research programme is reasonably clear, French theorists have 
not so far provided any clear definition of regulation itself. This criticism holds both for 
the concept in general and for its concrete application. This conceptual ambiguity 
reflects three aspects of their use of the term: first, in contrast to other key concepts in 
the regulation approach, it was first introduced to serve a diacritical or sensitizing 
function, marking off the regulationist approach from neo-classical concept of general 
economic equilibrium or from Marxist structuralism. They were less inclined to present it 
as a positive concept in its own right with a precise theoretical place in the movement 
from abstract to concrete. Second, whereas most of the key Marxist concepts refer to 
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the 'naturally necessary', enduring, invariant, and universal moments and laws of 
motion of capitalism considered as a mode of production, regulation refers to 
contingent, provisional, unstable, partial aspects associated with the external 
articulation of these relations with other social relations to produce more complex as 
well as more concrete concepts. And, third, there is some ambiguity about the precise 
object of regulation.  
The second source of ambiguity does not mean that the regulation approach is only 
concerned with the changing 'content' of capitalist relations as opposed to their invariant 
'form'. Rather, it claims, that, even at high levels of abstraction, the basic forms of the 
capital relation do not fully determine the course of capital accumulation. For the latter 
also depends on a variety of social practices, institutions, norms, and so forth: 
conceptualising and describing these is the special domain of regulation theory. In turn, 
once one undertakes more concrete studies of capital accumulation, one must not only 
define specific regimes of accumulation and/or spatially delimited modes of growth but 
also study their corresponding modes of regulation. Thus the regulation approach 
inevitably begins with form analysis and the tendential laws of capital accumulation but 
then moves on to analyse content and the actual, contingent movement of capital. This 
movement is dialectical. This is reflected in the duality of many regulationist concepts: 
the unity of 'unity and struggle', the dialectic of structure and strategy, the articulation of 
the esoteric and the exoteric, the links between reproduction and regulation. In this 
sense the regulation approach encompasses more than regulation. 
Nor is there much agreement about the object of regulation. This comment is not 
concerned to make the easy but cheap criticism that individual regulation theorists 
sometimes give different definitions of regulation. For such shifts could well occur 
because the term is being used diacritically and/or because it has been redefined in the 
movement from abstract to concrete. Instead it refers to the lack of unanimity among 
regulation theorists when they answer the question: what is to be regulated? For some, 
this is the wage relation, understood as the core relation in capitalism; for some, it is the 
articulation between the law of accumulation and the law of competition; for some, the 
relation among different national and regional economies within an international regime. 
Looking beyond French theorists to the Amsterdam and West German schools as well 
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as some radical American analysts, it is the social structure of accumulation or 
Vergesellschaftungsform of capitalist societies which needs regulation. This 
disagreement is related to the fact that all these objects do, indeed, need regulation. 
This suggests in turn that not only must there be regulation of specific sets of social 
relations but also procedures to secure a modicum of cohesion among these different 
modes of regulation concerned with different sites of regulation. This remark highlights 
the fact that regulation is a process and a result - it is not a specific site or object of 
regulation. Some of the problems this raises about the nature of regulation will be 
considered below. We will also address a problem which has gone largely unremarked 
in the French approach to regulation: namely, who or what is the active subject of 
regulation? 
  
V. West German State Theory and Regulation 
We now turn to the German connection. The West German school is linked with 
regulationist concerns in three main ways: its basic methodology, its interest in Fordism 
and post-Fordism, and its use of Parisian regulation vocabulary. In three other respects, 
however, it is distinctive. First, it has more fully explored the form of the state and the 
state's role in regulation; second, it argues that the primary object of regulation is the 
social formation; and, third, in Hirsch's earlier regulationist analyses, regulationist 
concepts are not so much located on different levels of abstraction (a la francais) as 
they are treated in terms of different planes of analysis. Since I have given detailed 
critiques of West German state theory and regulationism elsewhere (Jessop 1982; 
1988a; 1989b), my comments here will be brief. 
The West German state derivation approach tried to establish the nature of the modern 
state through a progressive, step-by-step movement from its most abstract 
determinations to its diverse, contingent forms and functions in particular cases. Its 
basic assumptions were similar to those of the regulation approach. In particular 
derivationists suggested that: (a) reality comprises a complex structured whole whose 
elements have a certain autonomy within an overall unity; (b) this complex structured 
whole can be analysed at different levels of abstraction according to a complex 
hierarchy of determinations; and (c) the results of all investigations (regardless of the 
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order of research) must be presented as a movement from abstract to concrete so that 
the whole (or that subset of its elements actually studied) can be reproduced in thought 
as the complex synthesis of multiple determinations. In this sense they adopted a 
realist ontology, a realist methodology, and a realist method of presentation. 
West German regulation studies emerge from one wing of state theory. Whilst one wing 
tried to derive the state's form directly from the imperatives of capitalist reproduction, 
another first derived its institutional form from the nature of the capitalist mode of 
production and only then considered this affected its capacities to act on behalf of 
capital. Whereas the first approach tended towards essentialism and functionalism, the 
second often argued that the very form of the capitalist state problematizes its 
functionality for capital. It thereby posed for the political region the same problem as did 
French regulationists for economic reproduction. And it is from this current that West 
German regulation studies emerged. Both have asked how capitalism could be 
reproduced (whether economically or, more generally, in social terms) when its typical 
social forms (the value form and/or the state form) generated contradictions and 
conflicts which could not be resolved in and through these forms alone. The West 
German answer was couched in terms of the state's role in instituting and managing 
society-wide regulatory procedures. These were labelled 'Vergesellschaftungsmodi' or 
modes of societalization. In this context 'societalization' refers to the process of 
structuration and regulation at a societal level. Societies are reproduced through a 
complex ensemble of institutionally mediated practices which operate in two interrelated 
areas. First, they secure at least a minimal congruence among different structures (the 
'system integration' aspect of the 'social formation'); and, second, they secure an 
'unstable equilibrium of compromise' among social forces (the 'social cohesion' aspect 
of the 'social order'). Thus, when societalization is successful, there is both an 'historic 
bloc' and a 'hegemonic bloc'. An historic bloc is, following Gramsci, a historically 
constituted and socially reproduced structural correspondence between the economic 
base and the political and ideological superstructures of a social formation. And, also in 
Gramsci's terms, a hegemonic bloc is a durable alliance of class forces which is 
organised under the dominance of a class fraction which has proved itself able to 
exercise political, intellectual, and moral leadership over the dominant classes and the 
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popular masses. Thus the West Germans extend the regulation approach from the 
question of economic reproduction to that of how capitalist societies get reproduced. 
Even this first question is quite wide when posed from the perspective of the wage 
relation; the second is wider still. For it raises interesting problems about the 
relationship between economic and societal regulation and how these processes are 
mediated in and through the state.     
Recent developments within this school have partially integrated Parisian regulation 
theory. Indeed, as Hirsch himself has remarked, in drawing on (and extending) French 
work and combining it with West German state theory, he can 'proceed from general 
(and therefore abstract) political theory to a concept useful for the analysis of actual 
changes in the political apparatus, essential for the political usefulness and relevance of 
theory' (Hirsch 1983b: 75). Two French regulationist concepts have proved especially 
useful: 'regime of accumulation' and 'mode of regulation'. They have been linked to a 
third, viz., hegemonial structure, which derives from Gramsci and Poulantzas.19 
Unfortunately it is not always clear from Hirsch's studies how he views these three 
concepts. Sometimes they only seem to provide new terminological bottles for the old 
Marxist trinity of economics, politics, and ideology (e.g., Haeusler and Hirsch 1987: 652-
3). But sometimes Hirsch seems to regard them as varying in their relative degree of 
abstraction rather than their substantive focus - with modes of regulation a concrete 
expression of an abstract accumulation regime. Even so Hirsch and his associates 
have tended to neglect the specificities of national and regional economies and to 
conflate an ideal typical model of Fordism with Modell Deutschland.20 A further problem 
occurs when they emphasise the qualitative dimensions of accumulation (the modalities 
of competition and class struggle, shaped but not fully determined, by specific structural 
forms) and neglect its quantitative dimensions (formal reproduction schemas, 
proportionality among different departments or branches of production, balanced 
growth in production and consumption). For this leads the West Germans to exaggerate 
the strategic moment and neglect the structural constraints involved in capital 
accumulation. 
These problems are reflected in various areas. Hirsch and his colleagues fail to 
present an abstract model of Fordism and then to specify its West German variant - 
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even though they often stress that there is no single model of Fordism. They also fail to 
discuss the specificity of the West German road to post-Fordism. And they face real 
difficulties in combining a general explanation for capitalist crisis tendencies with a 
concrete analysis of the crisis of Fordism. This reflects Hirsch's continuing commitment 
to a generic tendency of the rate of profit to fall as an explanation for capitalist crisis: for 
it means that he tends to reduce the crisis of West German Fordism to the generic 
crisis mechanism of capitalism (see Jessop 1988a;  Hübner 1987, 1988). It is also 
difficult to assess exactly what contribution regulationist concepts have made to 
Hirsch's analysis of the political. For his account of recent West German developments 
has remained largely unchanged as he has integrated the regulationist approach into 
his theoretical paradigm. In part this reflects the different strengths of the two 
approaches (since he has been largely concerned with the state) but it also reveals the 
need for a more rigorous and comprehensive engagement with regulationist concepts. 
 But things are not all black for the West German approach. For French theorists 
have neglected the state and, with the principal exception of Lipietz, do not operate with 
any concept equivalent to hegemonial structure. This may have made it easier for them 
to separate out different levels of abstraction in the economy but it also means they 
neglect the political and ideological planes of regulation examined by Hirsch and his 
colleagues (this issue is discussed further in section 00). Indeed, for all its faults, the 
West German approach is still important. It has integrated regulation concepts with 
analyses of state forms and it has extended modes of regulation to cover societalization 
as well as narrow economic reproduction. In this way West German theorists have 
avoided certain tendencies towards economic reductionism evident in much French 
regulation theory (see above). For, in contrast to the one-sided concern with the 
economic (even when this is defined in sensu largo) typical of much French regulation 
work, they provide a richer and more complex account of regulation and modes of mass 
integration across the economic, political, and ideological dimensions of social 
formations.     
 
VII. The Social Structures of Accumulation Approach 
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Although this approach is mainly concerned empirically with the United States, its 
theoretical scope is very ambitious. Indeed, with its interest in the conflicting logics of 
capital and democracy, it sometimes seems more comprehensive than regulation 
theory. This might well be broadly true of the GRREC and Parisian versions but it is 
less obvious for the PCF-CME approach or West German currents. Nonetheless, as 
Kuenzel notes, the range of issues to which the SSA approach has been applied is 
extensive:  
 
'The concept of SSA has been used to explain the connection between 
conjunctural cycles and "long waves" (Gordon, Weisskopf, Bowles 1983, 1984), 
stagflation (Weisskopf 1981, Rosenberg and Weisskopf 1981), the growth weaknesses 
of the British economy (Bowles, Eatwell 1983), changes in labour market structures 
(Gordon, Edwards, Reich 1982ff), the transformation of the labour process (Edwards 
1979), the frequency and duration of labour struggles (Schor, Bowles 1984), as well as 
changes in the relationship of state and economy (Bowles, Gintis 1982, 1986). All these 
studies show in convincing manner the need to introduce socio-political relations into 
the analysis of economic processes, as soon as one examines more than very short-
term changes of structural-functional relations. But they concern special partial aspects 
of the concept of SSA or remain still relatively vague regarding its analytical-operational 
content' (Kuenzel 103-4). 
The SSA approach was first presented by Gordon (1978, 1980) in terms of an 
institutional account of long waves in capitalist development. He argued that 'relative 
stability in the general social and economic environment affecting the possibilities for 
capital accumulation is a necessary condition for sustained and rapid accumulation; 
without such structural stability, the pace of capital accumulation in a capitalist economy 
is likely to slacken' (1980: 12). He then presented a list of thirteen institutional 
complexes which must be present for capital in general and (a significant number of) 
individual capitalists to be able to overcome the intrinsic contradictions of capitalism 
(class struggle and competition) 21 and accumulate effectively: these ranged from 
systems of natural resource supply and the 'social family structure' (family, schools, 
etc.) through labour markets and structures of labour management to structured social 
Page 37 
foundations of consumer demand (cf. 1980: 12-17). Gordon then argued that these 
institutions formed a unified, decomposable SSA with its own logic and internal 
contradictions and that it should be studied in its own right if capital accumulation and 
prospects for political change are to be understood (1980: 18). This leads him to 
distinguish between periodic business cycles from economic crises. For, whereas 
normal economic activities will restore cyclical upswings, an economic crisis involves 'a 
period of economic instability in capitalist economies whose resolution depends on the 
reconstruction of a social structure of accumulation' (1980: 20; cf. Gordon et al. 1982: 
26). This will only occur through a protracted class struggle to find a new SSA whose 
shape will depend on balance of forces during the crisis-resolution period (1980: 21-2). 
Rather than develop the institutional implications of this SSA approach, however, 
Gordon then speculated about the origins and amplitude of long waves in terms of the 
periodic bunching of the infrastructural investments necessary both to underpin a 
domestic SSA and to secure control over world markets (1980: 26-32). 
Later work by the American radicals has jettisoned these latter, general speculations 
and focused mainly on the SSA which sustained the postwar boom in the United 
States. Moreover, rather than working with thirteen institutional ensembles, they focus 
on four broad complexes concerned with: the capital-labor accord, the international 
balance of forces, the capital-citizen accord, and, introduced into the model only 
recently, competition among domestic capitals (on the first three, Bowles et al. 1982; on 
the fourth, Gordon et al 1987: 48, and Bowles et al 1988: 5). This shift in focus means 
that certain institutions (structural forms) which are important in the regulation approach 
(such as money, credit, and the structure of final demand) slip from view (cf. Verhagen 
1988: 3 et seq.). Overall the basic model remains the same, however, with the most 
crucial refinements occurring in its operationalisation and econometric testing.  
Most attention has been focused on three of the institutional 'buttresses of US 
capitalist power' which together formed the postwar SSA. A partial capital-labour accord 
brought big capital and organized labour together, replacing the conflicts of the 1930s 
and early 1940s, in a compromise in which workers gained an annual wage round tied 
to productivity in exchange conceding extensive managerial prerogatives to capital. The 
system of Pax Americana established the dominance of the US in raw materials supply 
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and world markets. And the so-called 'capital-citizen' accord. Together these accords 
produced a balance of power favourable to accumulation and subsequent shifts explain 
the movements of profit rate within the 'postwar corporate system'. 
A stylised account of the steps involved in the SSA approach would run as follows. 
First, examine statistical material to find phases in the development of key economic 
variables (typically the rate of profit and/or of of productivity growth); second, sketch the 
institutional developments associated with these phases; third, find some plausible 
connections between economic variables and institutional factors; fourth, develop 
indicators of these institutional developments; fifth, test the presumed relations through 
multivariate analysis (Kotz 1988a). In this context the link between institutions and 
economic variables must be given micro-foundations in the actions of the key actors: 
firms, workers, foreign economies, and citizens. This aspect of the analysis has been 
summarised by Bowles et al., as follows: 'one may take that set of institutionally 
determinate social relations as given historically; stipulate the relatively determinate 
interests which those social relations are likely to condition; trace the potential and 
actual conflicts of interest among constituent actors within that SSA which are 
engendered by those relations; and analyze how those resulting conflicts are mediated' 
(1988a: 51).22 
The main similarities and contrasts between the SSA approach and regulation theory 
should now be clear. Both accounts endogenise social structural factors in their 
analysis of accumulation. They are not treated just as essential, but external, conditions 
of existence of accumulation; they are also seen as crucial internal influences within the 
logic (or logics) of accumulation and the struggles which occur around it. Hence they 
both focus on long waves, swings, or stages of accumulation and their associated SSAs 
or modes of regulation. And, for similar reasons, one distinguishes normal business 
cycles from crises of an SSA, the other regulatory crises from crises of regulation. A 
further similarity is found in the shared concern with the dialectic of structure and 
agency. This is especially clear in attempt by SSA theorists to develop micro-
foundations for their macro-economic arguments through the use of stylised 
assumptions about actors' interests within a given SSA. But it can also be seen in the 
work of various regulation theorists. 
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Noting such 'family resemblances' between the Parisian and SSA approaches should 
not, however, blind us to key dissimilarities. For the context in which the SSA approach 
develops its analysis and its specific themes are quite different. Most obviously the SSA 
approach operates primarily on middle levels of abstraction without moving from more 
abstract levels as does the regulation approach. Its proponents reject the labour theory 
of value and work instead with a price-theoretic approach; but regulationists work, if not 
with the discredited labour theory of value, with a fruitful, form-analytic 'value theory of 
labour'23 (cf. Bowles and Edwards 1986: 10; Boyer 1985). This has three key 
implications.  
First, whereas regulation theorists examine the impact of modes of regulation on 
accumulation regimes and/or modes of growth, it is less clear on what object an SSA 
operates (cf. Kotz 1988: 7; and Norton 1988: 21-22n). There is no concept akin to 
accumulation regime in the SSA approach; instead it offers vague notions such as 
'stage' or 'phase' of accumulation or 'booms and crises' (cf. Verhagen 1988: 5). Second, 
this lack is associated with SSA theorists' concern with the quantitative issue of how 
institutions affect the rate of profit and, by assumption, the relative speed of 
accumulation. This contrasts with the regulationists' interest in the qualitative issue of 
how different accumulation regimes and modes of regulation modify the basic Marxist 
crisis tendencies (Kotz 1988: 7, 9). And, third, whereas the RA explains crises of 
regulation in terms of the interaction between accumulation regimes and modes of 
regulation, the SSA approach must focus either on institutional collapse of the SSA or 
changing power relations within the four pillars (cf. Kotz 1988: 12-13). Thus regulation 
theorists have explained the 1930s crisis in terms of how the competitive mode of 
regulation blocked balanced growth between departments I and II and traced the 1970s 
crisis to the exhaustion of Fordism as a regime of accumulation. At the most, however, 
SSA theorists have described how continuing accumulation undermined the power of 
US capital relative to their opponents in its so-called 'three-front war' against workers, 
foreign capital, and citizens. They suggest, for example, that sustained growth tightens 
labour markets and thereby increases organised workers' power.  
In turn this implies that accumulation could be renewed if the balance of forces was 
shifted back in capital's favour. In recent SSA work, however, it is unclear how this 
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might occur. Is a new social structure of accumulation required or would defeats in the 
class struggle suffice (contrast, for the US case, the regulationist analysis provided by 
Davis 1986)? The most recent SSA analyses seems to suggest that a new SSA is, 
indeed, needed: new research has indicated that the so-called 'Reagan revolution' may 
have shifted the short-term balance of forces in favour of capital but has not created the 
new institutions which would bring about a more fundamental, long-term shift. Thus a 
new SSA is required (cf. Bowles, Gordon, and Weisskopf 1989; Weisskopf, Gordon, 
and Bowles 1988). 
 In exploring these issues SSA theorists stress the links between power relations and 
profitability: indeed, they explicitly treat the latter as a measure of the power of capital 
(Bowles et al. 1988: 136). This raises problems similar to those in the 'capital is class 
struggle' analysis favoured by recent CSE critics of the regulation approach (for 
responses to this critique, see Jessop 1988a, 1989). For it seems to ignore form 
analysis in favour of pure power struggles and/or to reduce SSAs to the material 
condensation of class compromises. In neither case would material aspects of 
accumulation or its reproduction requirements (of the kind emphasised in regulationist 
reproduction schemas) be central to an analysis of crisis mechanisms or crisis-
resolution. Norton has criticised the American radicals on similar grounds, arguing that 
the SSA theorists posit abstract, pregiven interests and use formal models of power 
relations. But Bowles and his co-authors rejected this argument. For they claim to 
specify interests only within the framework and institutional logic of a given SSA and 
deny having adopted a pure, universal analytic of power (1988a). This defense against 
Norton's critique seems justified and they could also, perhaps, refer to their econometric 
tests of 'profits squeeze', underconsumption, and crisis theories as evidence that they 
are also interested in problems of proportionality.   
 
VII. Objects and Modes of Regulation 
We have already seen that regulation theorists differ about the key site of regulation 
and the nature of the mechanisms involved in the process of regulation (section II.2). 
Thus, although the various French regulation schools generally define the object of 
regulation in economic terms, individual theorists disagree about its exact nature. 
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Among the few West German theorists there is a broad consensus that the social 
formation is its main object and the state its principal agency. Likewise the American 
radicals examine social structures of accumulation and identify three (or, more recently, 
four) key sites where accords developed in the USA to regulate antagonistic power 
relations. The Amsterdam school focuses as much on the international (or 
transnational) level as the national and is also concerned with issues of societalisation.  
Such differences pose no real methodological problems. For, since regulation is 
essentially a process and/or a result of that process, a range of different objects could 
be regulated. But these differences do raise two key substantive questions. First, do the 
objects of regulation exist before they are regulated or are they constituted in and 
through the act of regulation? And, second, how are different objects and/or regulatory 
procedures related to each other? Let us now discuss these closely related problem 
constellations.  
 
1. Do its Objects pre-exist Regulation? 
This apparently absurd question poses some fundamental methodological problems. 
Regulationists take for granted that such objects as the commodity form, the laws of 
profit, the wage relation, the state, and social formations exist. Yet they also agree that 
their existence is fragile, conflictual, provisional, and unstable; and they insist that their 
reproduction is not guaranteed but depends on specific regulatory procedures. What is 
at stake here? 
If these objects are held to pre-exist regulation, one risks analyzing regulation in 
functionalist terms - whether in strong or weak variants thereof. Either the specific form 
and content of a mode of regulation is explained in terms of its adequacy to the needs 
of regulating this particular object of regulation. At its most teleological this variant 
would claim that the genesis and/or survival of a mode of regulation is explained by its 
necessary correspondence to its object of regulation. Parisian regulationists have been 
accused of precisely this mistake on the grounds that they explain postwar Fordism's 
stability through the fit between an already emergent intensive accumulation regime 
and a subsequent Fordist mode of regulation; whereas the interwar crisis is explained in 
terms of the survival of pre-Fordist modes of regulation preventing the realisation of the 
Page 42 
full potential of intensive accumulation 24. Or, in a weaker but still functionalist 
argument, an object of regulation could be said to exist because an adequate mode of 
regulation has developed to secure its continued reproduction in its original and 
essentially invariant form. This would amount to an a posteriori functional explanation 
whose explanendum is pregiven (cf. Lipietz 1987: 16; cf. Scott 1988: 172). 
To avoid such functionalist arguments we must examine regulation along different 
lines. First, we must treat the genesis of specific modes of regulation as historically 
contingent rather than as capitalistically pre-ordained. And, second, we must recognize 
that the objects of regulation do not, and cannot, pre-date regulation in their full 
historically constituted identity. If the first step avoids teleological functionalism, the 
second avoids a posteriori functionalism. For it precludes the concern with the role of 
modes of regulation in reproducing taken for granted, pregiven objects of regulation. 
Naturally this does not exclude asking in abstract terms how capital accumulation is 
possible and then referring to the facilitative role of an accumulation regime. But, for 
this abstract possibility to occur, it must be realized concretely; and this modifies the 
object which was previously posited in general terms. In this sense modes of regulation 
and their objects would be seen as structurally coupled and historically co-evolving and 
no a priori primacy would (or could) be accorded to one or the other.   
 
2. How to Avoid Teleology and Functionalism 
Thus, except in a very weak sense, the objects of regulation cannot really be said to 
pre-exist regulation. At most they could exist as a series of elements, different subsets 
of which could then be articulated in different ways to produce different ensembles, 
each with its own relative stability and unity. But they could not really pre-exist 
regulation as functioning ensembles with an essential, fixed identity. For regulationists, 
this would mean that the concept of regulation is theoretically redundant, since one 
could, after all, work with the concept of reproduction alone. Three more serious 
grounds can also be given for this conclusion, grounded in Marxian methodology, in 
recent developments in discourse theory, and in recent research on regulation. 
In the 1857 Introduction Marx argued that neither production in general nor general 
production existed: only particular production and the totality of production. But one 
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could still theorise production in general as a rational abstraction which enabled one to 
fix the elements common to all forms of production (1857: 85). In specific conjunctures, 
however, one found "a definite production" and this also "determines a definite 
consumption, distribution, and exchange as well as definite relations between these 
different moments" (1857: 99). Likewise we can argue that there is neither regulation in 
general nor general regulation: only particular regulation and the totality of regulation. It 
would certainly make sense (because it generates a rational abstraction) to reflect on 
the problems of regulation in general (either for specific objects of regulation or for 
societalization as a whole). But in the real world there are only definite objects of 
regulation that are shaped in and through definite modes of regulation. 
The same point emerges from examining the limits of form analysis. Although 
capitalism cannot be understood without exploring the ramifications of the value form, 
the latter does not itself fully determine the course of accumulation. Indeed the complex 
internal relations among the different moments of the value form (including the 
commodity, money, wage, price, and tax forms) have only a formal unity, i.e., they are 
unified only as modes of expression of generalized commodity production. The 
substantive unity and expanded reproduction of the capital relation depend on 
successful coordination of these different moments within the limits of the value form. 
But this coordination is anarchic (even under monopolistic or state monopoly regulation) 
and the circuit of capital can be broken at many points with resulting economic crises. In 
short, while the value form defines the basic parameters of capitalism, neither its nature 
nor dynamic can be fully defined in value-theoretical terms and further determinations 
must be introduced. But, once one begins to explore how the value form acquires a 
measure of substantive unity, there are many ways in which this can occur. Moreover, 
since capitalism is underdetermined by the value form, each mode of regulation 
compatible with continued reproduction will impart its own distinctive structure and 
dynamic to the circuit of capital. This implies that there is no single and unambiguous 
'logic of capital' but, rather, a number of such logics. Each of these logics will be 
determined through the dynamic interaction of the value form (as the invariant element) 
and specific modes of regulation and accumulation strategies (as the variant element) 
(cf. Jessop 1983, 1984). 
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Recent work in discourse analysis by Laclau and Mouffe points in the same direction. 
They proceed from the claim that social relations can be differentiated in terms of the 
specific discourses (or practices) which endow them with meaning. Laclau and Mouffe 
then distinguish between the general field of the interdiscursive and specific fields 
constituted by particular discursive practices. They treat the general field of the 
interdiscursive as a complex series of 'elements' available for integration into specific 
discourses. The latter fix the meaning of these elements in relation to an overall 
discursive system and thereby transform them into relatively fixed 'moments' in that 
discourse. But they also argue that no discourse can totally fix the meaning of these 
moments (there is always polyvalence and a surplus of meaning) and that no element is 
totally without some points of articulation with other discourses (Laclau and Mouffe, 
1985). Laclau and Mouffe have not yet applied their approach to regulation but its 
implications in this area are not hard to discern. Drawing on these three different 
theoretical currents, therefore, I propose the following response to the question whether 
its objects pre-exist regulation. Yes and no! For they both pre-exist regulation and are 
constituted in and through it. They pre-exist regulation as so many relatively free 
elements which can become objects for specific regulatory practices. Once integrated 
into a specific mode of regulation, however, they are transformed into 'moments' within 
that mode and thereby acquire a relative fixity. In Marxian terms, they become 'definite' 
objects of regulation. Moreover, pursuing this line of analysis, the same elements have 
points of articulation with alternative modes of regulation and can never be fully fixed 
within any one mode of regulation. Thus regulation is always partial and unstable and 
the balance between fixity and fluidity (or, in terms more familiar to regulation theorists, 
rigidity and flexibility) is complex and changing. Indeed, if the objects of regulation are 
too fluid, there is no solid basis for expanded reproduction; but, if they are too rigid, the 
law of value cannot operate to reallocate investment and the crisis tendencies of 
capitalism will be realized. Accordingly we must explain how regulatory procedures 
emerge, interact, and combine to produce this particular object of regulation rather than 
another and, once produced, what follows for the crisis-tendencies of capitalism. One 
could perhaps re-interpret the work of Aglietta and Brender (1984) along these lines. 
For they argue that regulation depends on a network of routines and institutions which 
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fix practices in ways compatible with accumulation. And crises occur when these 
routines and conventions lose their meaning and create periods of radical uncertainty 
until new patterns emerge.  
 
3. The Doubly Tendential Character of Capitalism 
 
Taking this analysis still further we can conclude that the tendencies and counter-
tendencies of capitalism are doubly tendential. First, they are tendential because the 
real causal mechanisms which produce them are only actualised in specific conditions 
which both activate the tendencies and limit the effects of any counter-tendencies. 
Second, they are tendential in a deeper sense: for their underlying causal mechanisms 
are themselves tendential, provisional, and unstable. If we accept that social 
phenomena are discursively constituted and that they never achieve complete closure, 
it follows that any natural necessities entailed in the internal relations of a given social 
phenomenon are themselves tendential. They would only be fully realized if the 
phenomena themselves were fully constituted and continually reproduced through 
recursive social practices entailed in such phenomena. Yet capitalist relations always 
exist in articulation with other relations of production and, at most, they occupy a 
position of relative dominance in the overall economic formation or productive system. 
Thus their laws of motion are always liable to disruption through the intrusion of other 
social relations which undermine the formal and/or the substantive unity of the capital 
relation. This can be established even at the most abstract levels of analysis since the 
reproduction of the capital relation itself always depends on the contradictory 
articulation of commodity and non-commodity forms (cf. Jessop 1983). In turn this 
implies that capital accumulation is never automatic but depends on a continuing 
struggle to prevent the disarticulation of the capital relation and a resulting loss of 
formal and/or substantive unity. Moreover, as we have already indicated, this is always 
and inevitably a struggle to maintain definite capitalist relations rather than capitalism in 
general. How this is achieved has been the principal theoretical concern of the 
regulation approach.   
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This also implies that the distinction between internal and external relations is at best 
relative rather than absolute.25 For, whatever the typical case in the natural world,26 real 
social objects are not fully constituted with clear and unambiguous boundaries within 
which definite internal relations could then generate natural necessities. On the 
contrary, real objects in the social world exist only tendentially and, a fortiori, as we 
have argued above, their 'laws of motion' are doubly tendential. This suggests in turn 
that well entrenched and stable modes of regulation could be seen as having their own 
natural necessities and laws of motion - which would, of course, be doubly tendential in 
the same way as the tendencies and counter-tendencies of the capitalist mode of 
production. Thus one could examine the logic of Fordism as an accumulation regime 
and/or mode of regulation in exactly the same way as one might explore the dynamic of 
the capitalist mode of production. Indeed, since neither capitalist production in general 
nor general capitalist production actually exist but only particular capitalist production 
and capitalist production as a whole and since the two last are always overdetermined 
by specific modes of regulation, there cannot be a radical break in the spiral movement 
of analysis as one proceeds from the abstract and simple to the concrete and complex - 
with natural necessities on one side, contingent events on the other. For any natural 
necessities of capitalism must be recursively and tendentially reproduced through social 
practices which are always (and inevitably) definite social practices, articulated more or 
less closely as moments in specific modes of regulation. In this sense these natural 
necessities are rational abstractions: there is no logic of capital but a series of logics 
with a family resemblance, corresponding to different modes of regulation and 
accumulation strategies.  
In turn this means that Fordism could have its own laws of motion (which would 
modify the abstract tendencies of capitalism) constituted in and through the stable 
articulation between the invariant elements of capitalism and the variant elements of 
Fordism: the invariant elements are nonetheless transformed as they become 
'moments' within Fordism. On more a concrete level still, we could distinguish the laws 
of motion of US Fordism from those of West German 'flexi-Fordism' or British 'flawed 
Fordism' in terms of the stable tendencies and counter-tendencies of the three different 
concrete forms of Fordism (cf. Jessop 1988b). Here the focus would be on how the 
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invariant elements of Fordism in general are overdetermined through their articulation 
with elements specific to each social and economic formation. In short the distinctions 
between invariant and variant elements, natural necessities and contingent 
circumstances, and reproduction and regulation, would, in each case, be relative to the 
particular stage in the movement from the abstract and simple to the concrete and 
complex.27  
Finally, if we turn from abstract theoretical considerations (whether Marxian or post-
Marxist in inspiration) to recent empirical research, we find that the objects of regulation 
are indeed always defined in and through specific practices. This has been established 
at all levels from the politics of production (Taylorism, Fordism) through specific regimes 
of accumulation and modes of growth to the overall articulation of historic blocs at the 
level of national social formations or the operation of international regimes of 
accumulation organized under the dominance of a hegemonic productive system. All 
these studies emphasize that objects of regulation acquire definite form only through 
their articulation with other objects and that particular modes of regulation play a central 
(but not exclusive) role in this respect.   
 
4. Regulation and Class Struggle 
 
From a different viewpoint, critical of regulation theory but still close to it, Clarke has 
argued that accumulation regimes should be seen as the specific institutional 
embodiments of class compromise (1988b, 84-5). In presenting this argument he 
criticises Aglietta and other regulation theorists of Fordism for seeing accumulation 
regimes as too concerned with balanced growth between the capital and consumer 
goods departments. For the real problem facing capital is not the quantitative problem 
of securing proportionality within and across departments of production (which is liable 
to continual disruption through the overaccumulation of capital) but is actually the 
problem of how capital manages to secure its class domination in the face of continuing 
class struggle and resistance (cf. Bonefeld 1988 and Holloway 1988). In the light of my 
comments above, however, this criticism can easily be dismissed. For objects of 
regulation do not pre-exist regulatory practices. Since the latter are never isolated from 
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the class struggle (however this is understood), it follows that the objects of regulation 
are always constituted in and through that struggle. In this sense nothing in the 
regulation approach as such involves denying that accumulation regimes, modes of 
growth, or modes of regulation might arise in and through class struggle. Indeed their 
doubly tendential character stems in part from this very fact. Moreover, if one assumes 
with the regulation theorists (and Marx before them) that the forms of the capital relation 
are deeply problematic for accumulation, there is ample theoretical scope for exploring 
how the very reproduction of these forms can contribute to crisis. Likewise, once it is 
agreed that class struggle cannot be confined within the limits of a given form, it is 
possible to explore how class struggles can both reproduce and undermine the 
dominance of specific forms (for further discussion of these points, see Jessop 1989a). 
Clarke's critique also highlights the need to study regulation on various levels of 
analysis. His comments would be devastating if the object of regulation were simply 
confined to the relationship between the two departments of production. But not even 
Aglietta's pioneer work adopted such a restrictive definition. Since then the range of 
possible targets of regulation has become even broader and a concern with 
Vergesellschaftung would certainly encompass all that interests Clarke in his study of 
the postwar settlement. There is another side to this question too. For the primacy of 
the class struggle must always be articulated to the contradictory logic of accumulation 
inscribed in the capital relation. Something more than a succession of capitalist victories 
in the class struggle is required to secure capital accumulation: their outcomes must 
also be congruent with the changing technical and material conditions for capital 
accumulation. As Gramsci stressed on several occasions, there is a 'decisive economic 
nucleus' to hegemony. This means that an adequate account of class domination must 
be as concerned with its material (but by no means purely quantitative) preconditions as 
an adequate account of capital accumulation must be concerned with its social 
preconditions in the balance of class forces. It seems to me at least that the regulation 
approach provides the means to reconcile these two aspects of capitalist reproduction. 
Indeed, as Aglietta noted in his thesis, an adequate account of capitalism must be 
equally concerned with both its faces: accumulation and regulation (1974).  
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5. Micro-Regulation and Macro-Regulation 
 
We must now consider the relation between different objects of regulation and their 
associated modes of regulation. The variety of objects reflects the complexity of the real 
world as much as it does the plurality of theories. But it also poses a problem: how are 
smaller sites of regulation related to larger sites and how are their relations mediated 
through structural forms and modes of regulation? Is there a mode of macro-regulation 
which accords different smaller sites their place within some overall regulatory strategy 
or does macro-regulation simply emerge from the interaction of lower level practices 
and/or partial modes of regulation? The distinction between macro- and micro-levels 
does not, in fact, involve an absolute ontological difference embodied in social relations 
as such. Instead it is a theoretical construct whose reference to scale is always relative. 
In regulationist analyses the micro-macro problematic occurs in two different guises: 
spatial or societal. In both cases the problem is how micro- and macro-levels are 
related.  
Spatially this problem has been defined in two main ways. It can involve the 
articulation between the national and international levels or, for the grenoblois, between 
productive systems and the global level. Or, analogously, it can involve the relation 
between the local or regional level and the national level in national social formations. 
Both forms raise important issues. For they pose the problem of the (economic) space 
in which a mode of regulation must operate: that of a global capitalism, a transnational 
space constituted in and through the activities of multinational firms, a pluri-national 
productive system, a social formation whose boundaries coincide with a nation-state, a 
regional armature 28, an economic branch or sector, a local economy, the enterprise. 
Arguing that the relevant space is less than global capitalism just shifts the issue of 
micro-macro relations to the latter level: how is global capitalism possible? But positing 
a global regime of accumulation with its own mode of regulation is implausible where 
this is understood as a total or totalising system. 
So far there have been two main regulationist approaches to this sort of problem. 
One privileges the micro-level and provides a bottom-up account of how macro-order 
emerges. Lipietz advocates this approach both elegantly and forcefully. He rightly 
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stresses that 'the history of capitalism is full of experiments which led nowhere: aborted 
revolutions, abandoned prototypes and all sorts of monstrosities' (1987: 15); and 
argues against reifying processes or systems such as imperialism which are at best 
merely partial totalisations. His own analysis of imperialism starts from the diversity of 
national formations and argues that the changing imperialist system is a contingent 
historical outcome of diverse national strategies and various relatively autonomous 
processes operating in a space which is plurinational, international, and transnational. 
Although he draws an analogy between the wave-particle duality and the difficulties 
involved in any one-sided solution to the issue of the relative primacy of the national or 
international dimensions, Lipietz still concludes that 'in reality struggles and institutional 
compromises take place mainly in the national framework, and thus methodological 
priority should be placed on the study of each particular social formation together with 
its external linkages' (Lipietz 1986c: 22). More generally he tends to see cohesion 
emerging from a chance structural coupling or co-evolution of different partial modes of 
regulation which happen to work together within the limits of compatibility implied in at 
least one possible reproduction schema (1987: 19-21). 
The other approach privileges the macro-level and provides a top-down account of 
macro-order: it is either imposed through a global logic of capitalism and/or through the 
successful hegemonic strategies of a dominant power. In (proto-)regulationist terms this 
view was put forward by the 'other' Grenoble school, i.e., the group linked to Palloix and 
Perroux and including the early Aglietta. This school argued that periods of stability in 
the world economy were linked to the hegemony of the current économie dominante, 
which imposed its accumulation strategy on other economies (e.g., Aglietta 1975). 
Similar views are found among regulationists who assume that postwar growth was 
based on the export of the Fordist model by the United States and/or its wholesale 
adoption within all advanced capitalist societies under the impact of competitive 
pressure. In certain key respects the Amsterdam school also belong here since it is 
particularly concerned with how comprehensive concepts of control get projected onto 
and realised on an international terrain through the actions of a fractionated 
transnational bourgeoisie and its associated states. As competing concepts circulate on 
a supranational political terrain there are periods of relative integration (e.g., liberal 
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internationalism, postwar corporate liberalism) and others when a prevailing global 
order decomposes into opposed blocs (e.g., interwar protectionist state monopoly 
capitalism) (cf. van der Pijl 1984, 1989). 
Turning to the micro-macro problem within societies, we also find two main versions. 
The first is posed in terms of historic blocs. In traditional Marxist terms this would have 
been analysed as the relation between the economic base and its supposed political 
and ideological superstructures. But modern Marxism, influenced by Gramsci among 
others, often poses this problem in terms of the complex separation, compenetration, 
and articulation of economic, political, and ideological institutions and forces which 
results in a relatively coherent and stable 'bloc' whose reproduction in and through 
'small' crises and relatively institutionalised class conflict stabilises its decisive 
economic nucleus.29 The second version involves the more general question of 
societalization, i.e., how different institutional sites and/or partial modes of regulation 
and/or specific social and structural forms are linked to produce the 'society effect'. In 
both cases a crucial role is often allocated to the state as the most important factor of 
social cohesion or regulation in national societies. Indeed it is often implied that that 
state can assign the appropriate role to partial modes of regulation within an overall 
strategy. 
A third approach is also possible. This would deny the existence of a simple micro-
macro split and just argue that there are many different sites of regulation and that they 
can be articulated in various ways and at different levels. Thus it would also stress the 
diversity and contingency of regulation and the contingent interaction of different partial 
modes without positing any one site as the crucial one. Wickham has argued this view 
very clearly in general terms but he does not refer, even indirectly, to regulation theory 
(Wickham 1984). Nonetheless the solution he proposes is that favoured here. Thus we 
would define a global regulation strategy as a strategy which attempts to subtend and 
articulate a number of smaller sites of regulation (social forms, structural forms) within 
its orbit. In this way a global strategy attempts to structure the possible field and scope 
of action on the smaller sites. These smaller sites nonetheless continue to have an 
independent existence and to constitute potential sites of structural recalcitrance and/or 
social resistance to the global strategy. Different global strategies will seek to articulate 
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different smaller sites so that the global sites on which these strategies will operate will 
also differ. In this context the notion of global must be understood relatively, that is, a 
strategy is global only in relation to its own smaller sites. A global strategy may itself 
constitute a 'smaller' site for an even more ambitious strategy. 
 This means that there is no macro-necessity in social regulation. In turn this implies 
that there is no a priori reason to view societies, pluri-national productive systems, or a 
global economy as the essential site of macro-regulation. At most there are attempts to 
constitute contingently necessary regulatory systems on different sites and in relation to 
different sets of smaller, more partial regulatory practices. Alternative global strategies 
will condense and transform different sets of conflicts and contradictions in and through 
a mode of regulation whose precise nature will vary according to the problems it 
confronts. In turn this means that we must think of a plurality of possible regulatory 
strategies even within the framework of one nation-state, whose precise character, 
social boundaries, cohesive capacities, and dynamics will differ according to which 
global strategy (if any) becomes dominant. And, in so far as one really can posit a world 
order or system, this could never be more than an emergent, contingent, provisional, 
and unstable result of various global strategies on a complex international and 
transnational terrain with different types of world order as their ultimate objective.  
Does this mean that the succession of modes of regulation and/or international 
regimes is arbitrary? In so far as there is only a limited set of feasible modes of 
regulation or regimes, clearly not. In so far as there is an irreversible dynamic and 
direction to capitalist development (growing socialisation of the forces of production and 
a succession of dominant modalities for extracting surplus-value), clearly not. In so far 
as nothing guarantees that a feasible mode of regulation or regime becomes dominant 
and so brings crisis and drift to a close, clearly yes. And, in so far as different productive 
forces can be organized and integrated into quite different modes of growth, clearly yes. 
Alternatively, in so far as no mode of regulation is fully constituted and quite often the 
most varied partial modes can co-exist, perhaps yes. It seems to me, in short, that such 
questions can only be answered through theoretically informed historical research into 
specific cases as they co-evolve through time and confront the fracturing and 
integrative forces to which all emergent systems are subject. In such research a key 
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area of enquiry must be the changing terms of the dialectic between structure and 
strategy. 
  
VIII. The Dialectic between Structure and Strategy 
 
The regulation approach has long stressed the strategic character of the capital 
relation. Thus Aglietta noted the importance of structure and strategy (notably in the 
giant corporation) in his thesis; as his work has moved away from a value-theoretical 
approach, issues of strategy have become even more central. Lipietz's early work 
emphasised the unity of unity and struggle; and subsequent work has always 
underlined the complementarities and contradictions among the economic and political 
strategies of different classes or fractions. GRREC too has insisted on the role of class 
struggle and competition in analysing regulation. Similar strategic concerns are evident 
in West German theorists' emphasis on accumulation strategy and hegemonic project 
and the Amsterdam school's focus on 'comprehensive concepts of control'. The SSA 
theorists have focused on changing power relations in their work on the US postwar 
settlement. And many others using regulationist concepts have also explored strategic 
questions.  
In principle, its advocates refuse to study regulation in terms of a structuralist model 
of reproduction or a voluntarist model of intentional action. The reproduction of capitalist 
societies is neither a fateful necessity nor a wilful contingency. Thus Aglietta (1982) 
regarded the emergence of modes of regulation as improbable; and Lipietz described 
them as chance discoveries (1985a). Many other accounts stress how accumulation 
regimes and/or modes of regulation emerge in a contingent, non-intentional manner. 
Where strategic conduct is involved it could well be more concerned to impose some 
coherence and direction on an already emergent structure as to bring it into existence. 
But, in presenting the regulation approach in these terms, they pose a number of 
questions about the precise relationship between structure and strategy. How exactly 
are accumulation regimes and accumulation strategies related? Or modes of regulation 
and regulatory strategies; hegemonial structures and hegemonic projects; social 
structures of accumulation and political strategies; accumulation and comprehensive 
Page 54 
concepts of control? If one or other term in each pair is not to be redundant, two 
theoretical fallacies must be avoided. 
The first fallacy is more voluntarist. Starting out from a given strategy, it posits a 
corresponding structure as its result. But this would be to neglect the tendential nature 
of all structures - which can be illustrated briefly through accumulation regimes. No 
accumulation regime could ever be explained as the product of a single accumulation 
strategy. For each regime has many, often unacknowledged and/or uncontrollable, 
conditions of existence and emerges from the clash of multiple strategies. It has only a 
relative unity and, in this sense, is better described as a structural ensemble than as a 
simple structure. Moreover, within such an ensemble, there are typically many 
irrelevant, residual, marginal, secondary, and even potentially contradictory elements; 
and even the unity of the more central elements typically involves gaps, redundancies, 
tensions, and contradictions. Failure to recognise these various problems could well 
lead to the Begriffsrealismus (reification of concepts) which Lipietz has condemned in 
theories of imperialism and also claims to discern in some recent regulation theories 
(Lipietz 1987; 1987a). 
The second fallacy is more structuralist. Starting out from a given structure, a 
strategy is sought which would be adequate to reproducing it. Given the complex and 
overdetermined character of an accumulation regime, however, no single strategy could 
be sure to maintain it. The relative success or failure of a strategy typically depends on 
unacknowledged material conditions of action which may alter; and it also depends on 
the changing balance of forces (including changing organizational capacities and 
competing strategies) that condition its realization. Thus the actual course of 
accumulation (over a given economic space from global to local levels) always results 
from the interaction of competing strategies in specific circumstances on a given terrain 
constituted not only by the existing regime or industrial profile but also by existing 
modes of regulation.  
In short there can never be a one-to-one correspondence between structures and 
strategies. To argue otherwise could re-introduce the functionalist problematic of a 
necessary correspondence between pre-given objects of regulation and particular 
modes of regulation. In practice objects of regulation are only partially constituted in 
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and through various regulatory procedures and their identity and stability are always 
fragile. More generally, if one insists on such a one-to-one relationship, there is also a 
risk of re-introducing a transhistorical subject whose global strategy is realized and/or of 
re-introducing the concept of reproduction and reducing concrete subjects to the 
necessary Träger (supports) of the dominant structure. Regulation theory was 
developed in part precisely to avoid such mistakes and this explains why some 
regulationists insist that accumulation regimes, modes of growth, and modes of 
regulation are 'discovered' rather than planned. There is no global subject to plan 
accumulation strategies, regulatory mechanisms, or hegemonic projects and to 
guarantee their successful implementation. Instead we find only different subjects 
whose activities are more or less co-ordinated, whose activities meet more or less 
resistance from other forces, and whose strategies are pursued within a structural 
context which is both constraining and facilitating. 
Thus, whilst there is real scope for class struggle in the structure-strategy dialectic, 
class strategies can never be purely voluntarist. To understand how capitalism is 
reproduced despite these complex contingencies, we must examine both the 
institutional inertia and strategic selectivity inscribed in specific accumulation regimes, 
modes of growth, and modes of regulation. The multiplication of institutional forms and 
regulatory mechanisms (as well as the self-substituting character of many of them such 
that, for example, black markets emerge when normal markets are suspended) actually 
create significant barriers to a general attack on the capital relation by fragmenting and 
disorganizing opposition and resistance and/or channelling it along particular paths 
where it threatens less harm to the core institutions of capitalism. Thus the 
structure/strategy dialectic does not separate struggle from structures but shows their 
complex forms of interaction. Structures are only prior to struggle in the sense that 
struggles always occur in specific conjunctures: but these conjunctures (with their 
complex and differential sets of constraints and opportunities) are themselves the 
product of past struggles.  
 
IX. Regulation and the State 
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It is fast becoming a cliche that its account of the state is a weakness of regulation 
theory - a comment made not just by its critics but also by its advocates. Even Boyer 
concluded his review by calling for 'second generation' research to include more 
detailed work on the state (1986a: 122-5; cf. Noel 1988). The main exception is West 
German work but this risks over- emphasizing the state's role as a regulatory instance. 
Let us consider some of the problems involved.  
 
1. Regulationists on the State 
 
Agreement among French regulation theorists on their general approach soon breaks 
down, as Theret comments, 'when they must locate the state as a specific level of 
society in the overall architecture of a mode of regulation' (1988: 1). Reviewing the 
whole field, how it is located seems to depend mainly on three inter-related theoretical 
factors: first, the specific object(s) of regulation which they examine; second, the 
substantive theoretical framework in terms of which such objects are studied; and, third, 
for periodising and/or conjunctural analyses, the specific stage or circumstances 
relating to this object. Let us briefly illustrate these points.  
First, theories which focus on relatively narrowly defined economic objects, such as 
the laws of profit, tend at best to treat the state as an ideal collective capitalist30. They 
have noted how the state apparatus and budget are deeply imbricated in the laws of 
profit (GRREC); how the state serves as a 'devalorisateur universel'31 (CME); and how 
the Fordist state regulates growth consciously whilst the liberal state leaves regulation 
to the invisible and unconscious hand of competition (Rosier and Dockes 1986: 204-5). 
In each case, however, the viewpoint is one-sided. Priority is given to economic function 
over state form, to economic policy over other policies, and to economic struggle over 
other struggles. This is less true, however, of the Nordic school. For, whilst its members 
are mainly concerned with economic policy and crisis-management, their background in 
institutionalism and their explicit comparative focus dictates a different approach. As 
well as different national modes of growth they also examine different types of political 
regime and forms of political alliance (e.g., Andersson 1986; Mjøset 1986; Mjøset et al., 
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1988). But the Nordic school has not yet developed an explicit regulationist approach to 
the state itself nor questioned its functionality for capital. 
Theories which focus on the wage relation (rapport salarial) look well beyond narrow 
economic intervention to the state's role as an important factor (if not the most 
important) in securing social cohesion. Indeed they often tend to see it everywhere. It is 
implicated in all the structural forms involved in regulation and acts to secure their 
overall cohesion or global 'metastability'. Thus Aglietta notes that the state penetrates 
civil society and profoundly restructures it to the extent that it becomes, for him, a 
constitutive element of the wage relation itself. It is the site where the various structural 
forms of regulation are concentrated and their mutual correspondence is managed over 
time (Aglietta 1979: 32, 383; 1982, ii, viii-ix). Likewise Boyer suggests that 'the state 
often plays the determining role in the diffusion, and sometimes even the genesis, of 
the essential institutional forms' of the wage relation (1986c: 53).  
There are two main problems here. There are reductionist dangers in the suggestion 
that the state's essential role is to manage the tensions and contradictions in regulation; 
and there are functionalist dangers in the claim that the state must do so for 
accumulation to proceed. But one need not adopt such assumptions. Indeed Noel 
insists that the best way to avoid both functionalism and the 'randomisation of history' is 
to ground a regulationist approach to politics in the historically contingent relations 
among the three principal actors in the wage relation (capital, labour, and the state) and 
consider how these relations are the joint product of modes of growth and specific 
forms of state and party organisation (Noel 1988). In addition, in focusing on the wage 
relation and class struggles, such theorists typically ignore the state apparatus itself and 
its distinctive modus operandi. This makes them vulnerable to the charge, levelled by 
Breton and Levasseur, that they tend to reduce the state to an 'etat du travail, i.e., a 
state whose functions are restricted to its role in reproducing the wage relation and 
socialising production and consumption norms (1989: 2-5). Hence, so the charge 
continues, they have neglected the state's role in 'anthroponomic regulation', the impact 
of liberal democratic institutions and rights on regulation, and the problems entailed in 
the state's national foundations when internationalisation is proceeding apace (1989: 
passim). 
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Other studies adopt an even wider focus and treat the state as the institutional 
embodiment of a class compromise which extends well beyond the wage relation. In 
addition to Parisian theorists (notably Delorme and Andre and Lipietz), we can also cite 
here the West German, radical American, and Amsterdam schools. Thus, as well as 
showing how French public expenditure has been influenced by the socialisation of 
productive forces and the impact of foreign and military factors, Delorme and Andre 
have also shown how they reflect and entrench specific class compromises (1983). 
Likewise West German theorists focus on the state's role in actively constituting a 
power bloc and, as a hegemonial structure, underwriting specific accumulation 
strategies and societalisation forms. The American radicals see the state as involved in 
all four accords: capital-labour, citizen, international, and domestic competition. They 
also stress that the democratic state is a site of conflict between the logic of capital and 
the logic of citizenship (e.g., Bowles and Gintis 1982; the same point is stressed by 
Breton and Levasseur 1989). And the Amsterdam school stresses the state's centrality 
in implementing a comprehensive concept of control at home and also in acting either 
as a relay for transnational concepts or else as a brake on their penetration (e.g. 
Holman 1987-8; van der Pijl 1988, 1989). Whilst these approaches often stress class 
struggle and the hegemonic role of one or other fraction of capital, the state is 
nonetheless accorded a key role in constituting and managing this struggle. 
Finally, some theorists have focused on the regulation of global regimes. Here the 
role accorded to the state depends heavily on how much weight is placed on economic 
issues compared to those of international cohesion. Thus some studies, concerned with 
the diffusion of Fordism, have focused variously on multinationals, trade relations, and 
the emergent and co-evolving complementarities among different modes of growth. 
Others, more concerned with the cohesion of the international regime as a whole, have 
emphasised the role of dominant or hegemonic states in defining and managing the 
international regime. The role of a transnational bourgeoisie in shaping the international 
order has also been emphasised by the Amsterdam school.  
Second, different substantive theoretical frameworks also influence how 
regulationists approach the state. Accounts which are mainly inspired by Kaldor or 
Keynes and thus focus on issues of postwar growth or economic management tend to 
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reduce the state's role to that of an instrument or agent of economic management. 
Where Kaleckian themes such as economic and political business cycles predominate, 
the class struggle enters in largely neo-Ricardian terms as struggles over distribution 
and the state is seen to manage the balance of forces so that accumulation can 
continue by restoring profits and creating demand. Some Marxist analyses, especially 
those linked to the state monopoly capitalism tradition, tend towards functionalist capital 
logic and/or reductionist class-theoretical analyses of the state. And others, more 
inspired by the Gramscian tradition and/or the West German form-analytic approach to 
the state, provide a more state-centred analysis in which the balance of forces is 
overdetermined by state forms and the sui generis dynamic of the political region.   
Third, periodisations of the capital relation also influence how much weight is 
accorded the state. This has both secular and conjunctural aspects. Thus students of 
long periods argue that the state's activities have expanded and intensified since the 
liberal, competitive stage of capitalism. This can be seen in analyses of state monopoly 
capitalism as well as studies of the intensive regime with its Fordist mode of regulation 
or SSA. The growing transnationalisation of capital has also been related to shifts in the 
state's role. More conjunctural studies suggest the state's role will be more extensive 
during crises of a mode of regulation than crises in it. The latter can be seen as part of 
the mode of existence of a stable mode of regulation (cf. Overbeek 1988: 25) and the 
state intervention follows an established routine or varies incrementally in response to 
cyclical movements, short-term instabilities, or random economic fluctuations. But, 
during the crisis-ridden transition from stage to another, the state must perform an 
enhanced role in restructuring the mode of regulation before it once again withdraws 
somewhat to forms of intervention consistent with the new mode (cf. Jessop 1983). The 
pioneering work by Delorme and Andre on the evolution of public spending in France 
combines these emphases: it provides both a secular account of the shift from the 
liberal state to the état inséré and a conjunctural account of shifts in expenditure in 
response to fluctuating, short-term circumstances (Delorme and Andre 1982). 
In short, just as the state can never be absent from modes of regulation, nor is it ever 
really absent from work on regulation. But its role is still largely neglected or distorted. 
This is mainly due to the uneven development of the approach itself. Most theorists 
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simply introduce the state into their accounts of regulation and/or subsume it under a 
general account of the structural forms through which regulation is achieved. With few 
exceptions, regulationists have adopted an already available account of the state to fill 
out their radically new approach to the economic region. They have not really applied 
the same approach to the state itself nor have they tried to integrate more adequate 
state theories.  
But, if one takes this approach seriously, it should apply as much to the state as it 
does to the economy. Three points above all should be evident. First, the state is 
neither an ideal collective capitalist whose functions are determined in the last instance 
by the imperatives of economic reproduction nor is it a simple parallogram of pluralist 
forces. It is better seen as an ensemble of structural forms, institutions, and 
organisations whose functions for capital are deeply problematic. Second, the state's 
unity is as underdetermined at the level of state form(s) as accumulation is at the level 
of the value form. Thus, if accumulation strategies are needed to give a certain 
substantive unity and direction to the circuit of capital, state projects are needed to give 
a given state some measure of internal unity and to guide its actions. And, third, 
securing the conditions for capital accumulation or managing an unstable equilibrium of 
compromise involves not only a complex array of instruments and policies but also a 
continuing struggle to build consensus and back it with coercion. Taking these three 
points together, then, the state itself can be seen as a complex ensemble of institutions, 
networks, procedures, modes of calculation, and norms as well as their associated 
patterns of strategic conduct. 
All this suggests in turn that the state cannot just be seen as a regulatory deus ex 
machina to be lowered on stage whenever the capital relation needs it. Instead the 
state itself must be an object as well as agent of regulation. However, whilst this list of 
formal elements may be the same, the particular elements involved, their substantive 
articulation, and their modus operandi will clearly be different as will the specific forces. 
This is what gives the political sphere its relative autonomy and means one cannot treat 
politics just as 'concentrated economics'. Indeed much recent work on regulation has 
emphasised how the fragmented structure of the state affects its capacities to engage 
in economic management or crisis-resolution and, conversely, how its sui generis 
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dynamic and the structural legacy of institutionalised compromise mean that it has a 
certain inertial force (Delorme and Andre 1983, Delorme 1987, Baulant 1988).  
 
2. A Regulationist Approach to the State 
 
A regulationist approach to the state would treat it like the commodity or wage relation: 
as an invariant which itself needs regulation. Four issues are crucial here: a) the 
problems involved in managing the state itself as a crucial instance or site of regulation; 
b) the regulation-specific strategic selectivity inscribed within the state system; c) the 
role of state structures and activities in constituting and reproducing specific objects of 
regulation; and d) the strategies adopted by different social forces towards the state 
and state power in the struggle(s) to restore, maintain, or transform a given mode of 
regulation. Let us deal briefly with each issue. 
First, the state does not exist as a fully constituted, internally coherent, 
organizationally pure, and operationally closed system but is an emergent, 
contradictory, hybrid, and relatively open system. Thus there can be no inherent 
substantive unity to the state qua institutional ensemble: its (always relative) unity must 
be created within the state system itself through specific operational procedures, means 
of coordination, and guiding purposes. There are two aspects to this 'apparatus unity': 
(a) the need for clear 'frontiers' or boundaries between the state and other institutional 
orders; and (b) the relative unity of the state within these boundaries. In addition the 
state is held responsible for promoting the interests of the 'illusory community' which 
exists in the wider society of which it is just a part. Regulationists have studied this in 
terms of the state's condensation of an institutionalised compromise and/or in terms of 
its organisation in and around hegemonic projects, comprehensive concepts of control, 
capital-citizen accords, or analogous projects. Precise terms apart, they recognise that 
an 'illusory community' must be defined whose interests and social cohesion are to be 
managed by the state. Without a measure of internal unity and a relatively consensual 
hegemonic project (together with its corresponding social base), the state cannot 
perform effectively in securing the political conditions needed for an accumulation 
regime.  
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Second, in this context, strategic selectivity can be defined as the form of political 
class domination inscribed within a given state system. This should be understood in 
terms of the specific configuration of state branches, apparatuses, and institutions, their 
specific powers and prerogatives of action, their specific relative autonomies and 
institutional unities, and their specific patterns of domination and subordination. These 
aspects overdetermine the general form of the capitalist type of state (in its institutional 
separation from the economic space of valorisation) and produce a specific system of 
structural and/or strategic selectivity. This means that the state is not equally accessible 
to all social forces, cannot be controlled or resisted to the same extent by all strategies, 
and is not equally available for all purposes. Different political regimes inevitably favour 
the access of some forces, the conduct of some strategies, and the pursuit of some 
objectives over others. An essential feature of any stable mode of regulation is the 
structural and strategic selectivity inscribed within the political forms which correspond 
to it.32 
 Third, since there are different emergent objects of regulation, different spaces or 
instruments could be important. The relative importance of the state's role varies with 
the object of regulation and, indeed, its activities are themselves a focus of struggle with 
a major impact on different modes of regulation. This is especially important because of 
the state's close ties to national economic space and means that internationalisation will 
require new forms of regulation. The best way to tackle this set of problems is in terms 
of specific national modes of growth and the historic blocs with which they are 
associated.  
This sort of approach can be seen in Lipietz's work. He notes that a mode of 
development (or, alternatively, a mode of growth) is based on a coherent and stable 
combination of a technological paradigm, an accumulation regime, and a mode of 
regulation. He adds that "the regime of accumulation would appear as the 
macroeconomic result of the functioning of the mode of regulation, on the basis of a 
model of industrialisation" (Lipietz 1986: 14). This analysis is linked to his view on 
hegemonic systems: these comprise a triangular relation between "an accumulation 
regime, which forms the base of the material existence of an hegemonic bloc, itself 
guarantor of a mode of regulation, which in its turn guides the reproduction of the 
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accumulation regime" (Lipietz 1985b: 11). This recalls Gramsci's stress on the 'decisive 
economic nucleus' of hegemony; but he goes beyond Gramsci in noting the role of a 
specific mode of regulation as the two-way mediating link between this material base 
and the hegemonic bloc. Moreover, when describing how the coherence of this triangle 
is materialised in structural forms which crystallise institutionalised compromises, he 
argues that the central form in this context is the state. For the state is both archetypal 
and also serves as the ultimate guarantor of the other structural forms (1985b: 11).  
The fourth major issue for a regulationist state theory concerns not so much the 
object(s) of regulation as its subject(s). Which strategies are adopted by what social 
forces towards the state and state power in the struggle(s) to restore, maintain, or 
transform a given mode of regulation? This cannot be meaningfully answered in 
abstract terms - references to the class struggle would be purely gestural without 
specifying the specific forces and strategies involved. Failing to specify the agents leads 
straight into class (or other agent) reductionism and referring to strategies without 
specifying the mechanisms and forces needed for their pursuit is equally sterile 
because a strategy lacking both agents and means for its realisation is little more than 
pie in the sky.  
Indeed, unless reference is made to concrete agents and strategies, structural 
factors will probably be over-emphasised - whatever the intention of the analyst. Thus 
regulationist studies have focused on the structural relations between the state and 
economic categories and shown little concern with how they are mediated in and 
through the strategic conduct and routine activities of social forces. There are certainly 
some gestural references in Parisian theory to notions such as Bourdieu's concept of 
'habitus' to indicate how the values, norms, and routines which might sustain a mode of 
regulation could be internalised in individual conduct (e.g., Lipietz 1986a, 1988). But, as 
Demirovic shows, not only are these references gestural but the concept of 'habitus' is 
theoretically inconsistent with the overall thrust of regulation theory (Demirovic 1988). 
Another proposed Parisian solution, favoured by Delorme and Andre as well as Lipietz, 
involves the state's role in institutionalising class compromise. But this is also 
unsatisfactory. For they do not tell us how the state can guarantees the various 
structural forms belonging to a mode of regulation or institutionalises compromises 
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favourable to its continued reproduction. And, more generally, as Birgit Mahnkopf has 
shown in her recent critique of Parisian regulation theory, there is a serious failure to 
consider the social dimensions in the crisis of Fordism and thus also to take them into 
account in proposals for alternative strategies in building a post-Fordist future (1988). 
Only the West German regulationists have paid much attention to the issue of 
agency and, interestingly, their solution is similar to Gramsci's. For the latter argued that 
the emergence and consolidation of a historic bloc required the development of 'party 
spirit'. Haeusler and Hirsch claim that the party system plays a key role in mediating 
between the state and individuals and institutions in society. Its special function within 
the complex of regulatory institutions is to constitute, express, direct, filter, and 
aggregate the many pluralistic, antagonistic interests in society. Pressures of electoral 
competition encourage the main parties to de-thematize and neutralise conflicts that 
might endanger social integration and to try to mobilize support around policies and 
projects which would polarise support around issues which cross-cut fundamental lines 
of social cleavage. In this way the parties of government both facilitate and legitimate 
relatively coherent state actions concerned with societal reproduction. Their strategic 
capacities in this regard are rooted in the internal heterogeneity of party organizations 
(with their different wings and local branches) as well as their relative openness to a 
pluralistic political scene occupied by enterprises, interest groups, churches, the mass 
media, and other public bodies (1987: 655-7). Haeusler and Hirsch imply that each 
mode of regulation has a corresponding form of party system and that a crisis in this 
mode of regulation will also be accompanied by a crisis both in the prevailing party form 
and the nature of the party system. 
Similar views occur in the Parisian tradition. Aglietta and Brender argue that modes 
of regulation institutionalize a balance of force among collective class actors: thus, 
when the existing structural forms face an organic crisis, this will also affect established 
class organizations. They are compromised by their integration into the mode of 
regulation and find it hard to represent new class interests and/or shape new regulatory 
forms. Thus the development of "new collective subjects" (cf. Gramsci on "new 
collective wills") must be involved in developing new modes of regulation (Aglietta and 
Brender 1984: 21-22, 162-5, 209-10). Likewise Noel suggests that political parties have 
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a key role, albeit one that is typically lagged by institutional and organisational inertia, in 
producing the political realignments which consolidate new 'implicit contracts' 
favourable to an emerging mode of regulation (1988: 19, 23-5). 
Whilst these arguments about political parties are interesting, we should not ignore 
the role of bureaucrats and other non-party intellectuals in developing the norms, 
modes of calculation, and procedures which sustain a given mode of regulation. 
Gramsci had already noted how hegemony could be grounded in the factory during the 
Fordist period and there are many other sites on which partial modes of regulation and 
specific regulatory procedures are mediated. More recently writers such as Roland Roth 
and Margit Mayer have shown how new social movements act not only as relays and 
agents of crisis in a mode of regulation but can also serve as useful fields of social 
experimentation in pioneering possible structural forms, norms, and strategies suitable 
for a new mode of regulation (Roth 1987; cf. Hirsch and Roth 1986; Mayer 1987, 1988). 
But the general point remains valid, namely, that, unless one examines the mediation of 
regulation in and through specific social practices and forces, regulation will either go 
unexplained or will be explained in terms of 'speculative' structuralist categories. Since 
the regulation approach in all its guises was developed precisely in order to overcome 
structuralism as well as mechanical theories of general economic equilibrium. 
 
X. Concluding Remarks 
 
Much ground has been covered in this review and it has often been concerned with 
abstract and arcane matters. Readers might well ask whether the regulation approach 
is not just one among several interesting ways of approaching Fordism and post-
Fordism, the conditions for postwar growth, and the causes of inflation? Why then deal 
with ontology or methodology? I would reply that the regulation approach's import is as 
much methodological as substantive. This is why this chapter has ignored the general 
substantive differences between regulation and other approaches to capitalism, the 
adequacy of regulationist crisis theories (on this, see  Hübner 1989), and the internal 
consistency of specific regulation theories (see, for example, critiques of Aglietta in 
Davis 1978 and Clarke 1988b). Instead it has been more concerned to establish how its 
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basic methodological features enable one to link some form of regulationist analysis of 
political economy with parallel theoretical enquiries into other regions of the social 
world. Indeed, as my remarks on discourse analysis as well as on the state should have 
indicated, analogous studies of other areas also have major implications for the 
regulationist analysis of capitalist itself. 
The four distinctive features of the regulation approach were defined as follows. It 
works with a realist ontology and epistemology; adopts the method of 'articulation' in 
theory construction; operates within the general Marxist tradition of historical 
materialism with its interest in the political economy of capitalism and the anatomy of 
bourgeois society; and is especially concerned with the changing forms and 
mechanisms (institutions, networks, procedures, modes of calculation, and norms) in 
and through which the expanded reproduction of capital as a social relation is secured. 
Nonetheless regulation theories do differ in their definition of the object of regulation, 
the level(s) of theoretical abstraction on which they operate, the periodisation they offer, 
the directions in which they have extended the regulation approach, and the 
conclusions they draw from the regulation approach for policy and politics.  
How should the regulation research programme develop? There are clearly problems 
with specific regulationist analyses and, in advocating a regulation approach, I am 
certainly not supporting all the substantive arguments they have advanced. Indeed, 
since they are often ambiguous, contradictory, or plain wrong, this would be foolish. But 
the basic research agenda is worthwhile and offers more chance for theoretical and 
political advance than the available alternatives. It is clearly committed to the concrete 
analysis of concrete conjunctures through a rich and complex range of economic and 
political concepts directly related to the nature of the capitalist exploitation and 
domination. Some analyses may have short-circuited the analytical method implied in 
the overall research agenda but this should not condemn the general approach. It 
merely points to the dangers of applying it too hastily and/or unthinkingly. 
Clearly, until more detailed local, national, regional, and international studies have 
been completed, the dangers of analytical short-circuiting will remain. Particularly 
important for such research are intermediate concepts such as modes of growth and 
international regimes for economic analysis, forms of state for political analysis, and 
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modes of regulation and historic blocs for societal analysis. Empirically, what is needed 
are accounts of national modes of growth, their insertion into the international economy, 
the specific national modes of regulation with which they are associated, the dynamic of 
specific forms of state, and the specific 'historic blocs' and associated 'hegemonic 
systems' to which these have given rise. It is in this intermediate area that the regulation 
approach is most promising. 
 Theoretically, what is needed is a synthesis of regulationist, state theoretical, and 
discourse-analytic concepts. All three schools operate with a realist ontological and 
epistemological framework; they have each produced concepts to describe not only the 
underlying causal mechanisms, powers, liabilities, tendencies and counter- tendencies 
in their respective fields; and they have also produced concepts on a middle range, 
institutional level to facilitate detailed conjunctural analyses. Regulation theory and state 
theory have also been concerned with stages and phases of capitalist development 
rather than with abstract laws of motion and tendencies operating at the level of capital 
in general and/or the general form of the state. But the three approaches differ in their 
emphases on different institutional clusters in the process of societalization. The 
regulation approach stresses the successful development and institutionalization of a 
mode of regulation whose principal features are defined in terms of their contribution to 
maintaining the capital relation. State theory is more concerned with the state's central 
role as a factor of social cohesion in class-divided societies and is more inclined 
towards politicism. Discourse analysis, strongly influenced by Gramsci's work on 
hegemony, emphasises political, intellectual, and moral leadership. In short, while all 
three approaches concern societalization, they tend to prioritize economic, political, and 
ideological factors respectively. 
However, as indicated in my comments on the objects of regulation, micro- and 
macro-regulation, and the nature of the state, a regulationist approach can help 
overcome the tendencies towards one-dimensional analyses characteristic of each 
approach. The key to this solution can be found in Gramsci's concepts of 'historic bloc' 
and 'hegemonic bloc' and it is interesting to note how those regulationists who have 
gone furthest in overcoming this sort of one-sidedness have been influenced by the 
Gramscian tradition. This can be seen in the work of Lipietz among the French 
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regulationists, Hirsch among the West German state theorists, and, though not yet 
consciously aligned to the regulation approach, the Laclau and Mouffe among 
discourse theorists. This seems to me the most appropriate route to take in developing 




1. A first version of this paper was presented at the International Conference on 
Regulation Theory, Barcelona, June 16-18, 1988. In revising it I have benefitted from 
discussions with Paul Boccara, Werner Bonefeld, Robert Boyer, Alex Demirovic, Josef 
Esser, Joachim Hirsch, Kurt  Hübner, Wibo Koole, Alain Lipietz, Birgit Mahnkopf, Lars 
Mjøset, Henk Overbeek, Kees van der Pijl, Renato di Ruzza, Rob Stones, Michel de 
Vroey, and Carsten Wiegrefe. I assume full responsibility for the arguments presented 
here as well as for the translations. Thanks to ZIF at the University of Bielefeld for its 
support during a first revision and the ESRC during its final revision.   
2. See Jessop 1982: 213-20; cf. Poulantzas, 1968; Aglietta 1974; and, for a first 
statement, Marx 1857. 
3. The American radical approach is also broadly Marxist. It emerged in 1968 in 
opposition both to orthodox neo-classical economics and to the 'old' Marxist tradition of 
concern with monopoly capitalism (cf. Bowles and Edwards 1986; Ipsen and Lohr 1986; 
Klamer 1984). It has always adopted a conflict-theoretic analysis of capital-labour 
relations, treated accumulation as profit-driven, and stressed how socio-political 
institutions should be treated neither as 'exogenous' nor as 'epiphenomenal'. But it 
rejects the labour theory of value, its central concepts of the organic composition of 
capital and the rate of exploitation, and attempts to derive fundamental 'laws of motion' 
of capitalism (such as the TRPF), preferring to work with price-theoretic concepts (cf. 
Bowles and Edwards 1986: 10, 14n). 
4. INSEE is the acronym for the Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes 
Economiques and CEPREMAP stands for Centre d'Etudes Prospectives d'Economie 
Mathematique Appliquees a la Planification; both are associated with the French 
planning apparatus. 
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5. On the Althusserian heritage, see Aglietta 1976: 12-14; idem 1982: vi-x; Lipietz 1978 
and 1987; Jenson and Lipietz 1987. 
Definitions of extensive and intensive regimes vary within and across studies of 
different authors. Aglietta (1979) defined them in terms of the relative dominance of 
absolute and relative surplus-value respectively; for a telling critique of this version, see: 
Davis 1978. 
6. In both cases these are ideal types: not every worker in the intensive regime is 
involved in collective bargaining and enjoys rising consumption. The key point is to 
identify the lead sectors in an economy or productive system. For an empirical critique, 
see Marsden 1986; for empirical support, Aglietta 1979; Boyer 1986c. 
7. This involves devalorization in the sense that the return to public investment or 
subsidies is below average, nil, or negative but it results in the upward valorization of 
monopoly capital. 
This is not intended to reproduce stale 'base-superstructure' arguments. Along with 
other realists, however, I emphasize the emergent properties of different regions in the 
natural world and the emergence of the social from the natural world. The higher 
stratum objects, with their own emergent properties, react back on lower levels by 
exploiting contingencies at these levels - not by breaking the natural necessities at 
these levels (cf. Sayer 1980: 11). 
8. Here levels refers to the ontological depth of the real world. Following Bhaskar (1980) 
these levels can be defined as the real (the level of causal powers and liabilities), the 
actual (the level on which these powers are realised in specific conditions), and the 
empirical (the level of observation).  
9. One should not equate tendencies and counter-tendencies with powers and liabilities 
respectively. The counter-tendencies to the rate of profit to fall are causal mechanisms 
equivalent to the basic tendency; the conditions that make capitalism liable to crisis also 
derive from its basic tendencies and counter-tendencies. 
10. Adopting one or another form of realist ontology is a condition of intelligibility of 
science; but, given this assumption, there can be no guarantee that any particular 
realist ontology is the correct one. A failure to distinguish between the theoretical 
necessity of realist ontology and epistemology in general and the contingent and 
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conventional character of any particular realist ontology and epistemology underlay the 
problems which led the post-Althusserian scholars, Hindess and Hirst, to consign all 
epistemology to the ideological dustbin of scientific history. Cf. Hacking's contrast 
between 'realism-in-general' and 'realism-in-particular' (1983: 31). 
11. This does not mean that it is defined solely within thought. Something that is 
discursively constituted can (but need not) also be rooted in social practices and 
institutions. Thus Marx started Capital with the commodity: a social reality in the 
capitalist mode of production as well as a category of thought. The 'double 
hermeneutic', i.e., a hermeneutic framework about a social reality that is already pre-
interpreted by its participants, is a general version of this (Giddens 1976: 148-54). 
12. The argument in this and the next paragraph derive from my book on The Capitalist 
State (1982). The methodological problems involved in regulation theory are the same 
as those in marxist work on the state. 
13. Althusser and his colleagues were more concerned with the general theory of 
modes of production and with the overall articulation of the capitalist mode; they did not 
really investigate the dynamic of capitalism itself. Similarly Poulantzas focused on the 
political sphere and its relation to class struggle and ignored the economy; thus his 
various accounts of relative autonomy must be deemed incomplete. 
14. This approach is reminiscent, as Drugman notes, of the GRREC account, with its 
emphasis on the articulation of the law of accumulation and the law of competition 
(Drugman 1984: 31, 45). 
15. Social need refers to "expanded reproduction of the wage labour force conforming 
to the exigencies of capital, expanded reproduction of constant capital, and capitalist 
consumption" (de Bernis 1981: 170; GRREC 1983: 60).  
16. In contrast the Parisian school tends to locate the space of regulation at the national 
level on the grounds that the wage relation, the state, and monetary control are all 
based on the nation-state (Benassy, Boyer, and Gelpi 1984: 400). Mistral also starts out 
from the separation of national economies. But he then shows how structural forms of 
regulation specific to the dominant international regime operate to integrate as well as 
fragment the global economy in and through their impact on the complementarities and 
competitiveness among the modes of growth which characterise national economic 
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spaces. This in turn gives rise to two polar, but interrelated, logics, each with its 
associated forms of strategy: those of adhesion (movement up the international 
hierarchy) and eviction (movement down the hierarchy ending eventually in exclusion) 
(Mistral 1986).  
17. Hirsch defined 'hegemonial structure' as 'the historically specific connection 
between an accumulation regime and a mode of regulation which, together, can secure 
the long run economic (valorization) and political-ideological (legitimation, force, and 
consensus) conditions for the reproduction of the total system under the dominance of 
the ruling class despite the conflictual character of capitalist social relations (Haeusler 
and Hirsch 1987: 653; Hirsch and Roth 1986: 38-9; Hirsch 1983a: 163). 
18. For some purposes the grenoblois concept of 'productive system' seems better than 
'mode of growth' but they need not clash. Any national economic formation will have its 
own 'mode of growth' overdetermined by the form and policies of the nation-state, 
nationally specific social structures, and national identity; but the 'mode of growth' is 
also determined by the insertion of the national economic formation into the 
international economy - and this could well be explored in and through its insertion into 
a productive system and the links between this system and the wider international 
regime. 
19. Reference to class struggle and competition recalls GRREC's two laws, Aglietta on 
the rapport salarial and rapports inter-capitalistes, and similar French ideas. 
20. Boyer has described the regulation approach method as follows: periodise 
institutional forms in terms of key-dates and different phases; determine the implicit 
logic of these forms, perhaps using econometric tests for different periods; see if the 
partial logics add to an overall logic, using macro-economic models; investigate their 
long-term dynamics, examining intrinsic tendencies, modelling different regimes and 
different structural crises (Boyer 1986a: 72-78). 
21. The distinction between the value theory of labour and the labour theory of value is 
presented most clearly in the essays in Elson, ed., 1979 
22. This critique has been developed most fully, in terms of residual functionalism and 
correspondence theories, in Becker (1988). 
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23. It could also be argued that the distinction between necessity and contingency is 
relative. For, in the course of specifying a hierarchy of conditions of possibility, the more 
abstract levels will be compatible with more possible outcomes and indeterminate with 
reference to the actual result; the more concrete levels will define progressively more 
restrictive limits on actual outcomes as they overdetermine the more abstract conditions 
of possibility. Similar considerations apply to 'complexification': for introducing additional 
planes of analysis will further delimit possible outcomes of a given set of mechanisms. 
In adopting this view we can avoid the spurious difficulties involved in closing the gap 
between abstract conditions of existence and empirical variation in the forms through 
which these conditions are secured. Instead there is a hierarchy of conditions of 
existence corresponding to the hierarchy of levels of abstraction at which a theoretical 
object can be specified: the more concrete the specification of the explanendum, the 
more determinate will be the forms through they can be realized. Conditions of 
existence also have their own conditions of existence and these may include recursively 
reproduced features of the objects whose conditions they in turn secure. This suggests 
that natural necessities are contingent on the reproduction of the objects (with their 
internal relations) which generate these necessities; and that contingent necessities are 
necessary in the sense that a given combination of internal and external relations must 
produce this particular outcome even though it is unnecessary when viewed purely from 
the side of the internal relations (cf. Jessop 1982: 206, 218).  
24. Not all natural objects are so clearly defined by their fixed internal relations as, say, 
iron is through its chemical and physical properties; ecological systems, to take a 
contrary example, often have ambiguous boundaries which are contingently realized 
and reproduced. 
25. This argument should help us clarify the dispute between GRREC, which insists 
that capitalist laws of motion are invariant, and Boyer, who warns against accepting 
invariant laws and claims that capitalist laws vary with the dominant mode of 
development (articulation of accumulation regime and mode of regulation). See: Boyer 
1986: 22, 26-7; and di Ruzza, 1987. 
26. Lipietz distinguishes between an economic region and a regional armature. The 
former is a space 'in itself' which comprises a homogeneous area in which modes and 
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forms of production are articulated. The latter is a space 'for itself' where the dominant 
clases of the local hegemonic bloc control their own political and ideological 
apparatuses enabling them to regulate on a local scale some social and economic 
conflicts. It differs from the national state in having no universalistic legal system, no 
monetary unit, and no monopoly of violence (Lipietz 1985b: 11-12). 
27. Even this simplifies matters by reducing institutions to a triplet. 
28. The concept of 'ideal collective capitalist' suggests that a state acts to secure the 
collective interests of capital but does not itself act as one competing capital among 
others - hence its 'ideal' rather than 'material' character as a collective capitalist.  
29. This phrase is used, critically, by Theret and Wieviorka (1978). 
30. This notion of selectivity is implicit in Parisian ideas on the state as an institutionally 
fragmented system of institutionalised compromise. They also consider how the 
success of state policies depends on the state's own institutional matrix and the ways it 
is articulated to economic structures at meso- and macro-levels. On this see: Andre and 
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